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Abstract
The economy and social well-being of a community heavily rely on the avail-
ability and functionality of its critical infrastructure systems, including power,
water, gas, and transportation. Roadway networks are a fundamental compo-
nent of transportation systems and, in the event of an extreme hazard, play a
critical role during and after the event. Consequently, quantifying the perfor-
mance of transportation infrastructures and optimizing decisions to mitigate,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from the potential hazards. This research
presented a novel resilience-based framework to support resilience planning
regarding pre-disaster mitigation and post-disaster recovery.
First, the author proposes a new performance metric for transportation net-
work, weighted number of independent pathways (WIPW), integrating the
network topology, redundancy level, traffic patterns, structural reliability of
network components, and functionality of the network during community’s
post-disaster recovery in a systematical way. To the best of our knowledge,
WIPW is the only performance metric that permits risk mitigation alterna-
tives for improving transportation network resilience to be compared on a
common basis. Based on the WIPW, a decision methodology of prioritizing
transportation network retrofit projects is developed.
Second, our studies extend from pre-disaster mitigation to post-hazard recov-
ery, in which this research presents two metrics to evaluate the restoration over
the horizon after disasters . That is, total recovery time and the skew of the
recovery trajectory. Both metrics are involved in the multi-objective stochastic
optimization problem of restoration scheduling. The metrics provided a new
dimension to evaluate the relative efficiency of alternative network recovery
strategies. The author then develops a restoration scheduling methodology
xi
for network post-disaster recovery that minimizes the overall network recov-
ery time and optimizes the recovery trajectory, which ultimately will reduce
economic losses due to network service disruption. The WIPW, pre-disaster
mitigation, and post-disaster recovery are illustrated in the same hypothetical
bridge network with 30 nodes and 37 bridges subjected to a scenario seismic
event.
Finally, a comprehensive stage-wise decision framework is introduced. The
entire resilience planning is separated into three stages, pre-disaster mitiga-
tion, post-disaster emergency response, and long-term recovery. The WIPW
is decomposed to three specific decision metrics to measure the performance of
a network regarding robustness, redundancy, and recoverability, respectively.
Decision support models for mitigation and recovery developed in the previ-
ous studies are revised to accommodate the stage-wise metrics. The proposed
stage-wise framework is applied to a real-world roadway network of Shelby
County, TN, USA subjected to seismic hazards.
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. Background
Transportation networks play a vital role in ensuring the economic and social
well-being of a community and the condition of such networks following the
occurrence of an extreme hazard (e.g. earthquake, extreme wind storms, flood,
terrorism, etc.) has a significant impact on the recovery of the community. The
resilience of robust, large-scale, interdependent civil infrastructure networks,
including transportation systems, utilities, telecommunication facilities, and
social networks, individually and collectively play a major role in determining
the resilience of a community as a whole. The performance of transportation
networks, in particular, is critical because post-disaster restoration of virtually
all other facilities and lifelines in a community depends on people and equip-
ment being able to move to the sites where damage has occurred. Highway
bridges typically are the vulnerable links in road transportation systems and
require especially effective risk mitigation strategies aimed at improving the
1
overall resilience of transportation systems against future natural disasters.
Highway bridges are vulnerable components in road transportation system,
and robustness and recovery of the transportation network as a whole highly
depends on their performance. Large-scale hazards can damage many bridges
in a transportation system simultaneously, and the loss that results from this
damage can be classified into two categories: initial direct loss caused by struc-
tural damage and indirect loss caused by downtime of the network before its
full recovery. The initial loss is determined by the vulnerability of the network
to the hazard event [14, 19, 95, 96, 66, 98, 93, 94, 97, 92, 90]. The indirect
loss due to downtime, which often is long-term and equally significant, largely
depends on the overall recovery time and trajectory of the network. This
chapter investigates bridge-road transportation network restoration schedules
that minimize the recovery time and optimize the recovery trajectory of the
network as a whole; such optimal schedules ultimately lead to reduced indirect
economic losses resulting from the downtime of damaged road systems.
The economy and social well-being of a community heavily rely on the avail-
ability and functionality of its critical infrastructure systems, including power,
water, gas, and transportation. Roadway networks are a fundamental compo-
nent of transportation systems and, in the event of an extreme hazard, play
a critical role during and after the event. For example, prior to the land-
fall of a hurricane, roadways are crucial for population evacuation; during a
flood event, available roadways may provide key means of rescue; and dur-
ing the longer-term recovery, the accessibility of schools, businesses, centers
of government and commerce, etc. are significant elements of the economic
recovery and social well-being of a community. However, the components of
2
a roadway network, i.e. roads and bridges, are directly vulnerable to extreme
hazard events; for instance, the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 damaged 1,657
bridges in China [100]; Hurricane Irene in 2011 affected over 500 miles of
highways, 2,000 miles of roadways, and 300 hundred bridges in Vermont [67].
Such physical damage can lead to extensive and expensive functionality losses
to the impacted community. For example, Hurricane Sandy in 2012 caused
$7.5 billion loss in direct damage to the New York transportation infrastruc-
ture (WABC-TV/DT, http://abc7ny.com/archive/8911130/), which does not
included the indirect loss of lives, commerce, or other losses associated with
the inability to effectively access emergency facilities or services, to route re-
pair crews, or provide access to places of business. The flooding caused by
hurricane Harvey prevented 9,000 victims from evacuation in Houston. En-
hancing transportation network resilience to these natural hazards has become
a national imperative [65].
The resilience of robust, large-scale, interdependent civil infrastructure net-
works, including transportation systems, utilities, telecommunication facilities,
and social networks, individually and collectively play a major role in deter-
mining the resilience of a community as a whole. The performance of trans-
portation networks, in particular, is critical because post-disaster restoration of
virtually all other facilities and lifelines in a community depends on people and
equipment being able to move to the sites where damage has occurred. High-
way bridges typically are the vulnerable links in road transportation systems
and require especially effective risk mitigation strategies aimed at improving
the overall resilience of transportation systems against future natural disasters.
In the dissertation, a new resilience-based performance metric of transporta-
3
tion is developed, which can be either used directly as an individual perfor-
mance indicator for any transportation network or flexible to be decomposed
to measure one of the aspects (i.e., robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness,
and rapidity) commonly used in resilience. According to different scenarios,
different metrics will be constructed and the corresponding optimization mod-
els will be proposed to resolve problems of mitigation optimization, project
ranking mechanism for prioritizing transportation network retrofit projects,
emergency response, post-disaster recovery scheduling, respectively. Finally,
all the proposed mathematical models are illustrated on a virtual bridge net-
work and a real-world transportation network of Shelby County, TN, US.
1.2. Principal Goals
The principal goals of the research are to develop sound resilience-based met-
ric for transportation infrastructures, optimization models for risk mitigation,
emergency response, and recovery. To achieve the goals, the specific research
tasks are given as follows:
• Perform literature review in each chapter about the corresponding topic.
• Formulate a resilience-based metric to evaluate the transportation in-
frastructures.
• Develop an efficient optimization model to search the optimal retrofit
planning in terms of improving the resilience-based metric.
• Formulate a two-dimension metrics to evaluate the post-disaster recovery
trajectories.
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• Model the recovery scheduling problem using stochastic optimization to
find the most rapid and efficient trajectories.
• Build the stage-wise metric system to flexibly evaluate the performance
in terms of the occurrence of hazards.
• Develop the corresponding stage-wise decision framework to support pre-
disaster planning, emergency response, and post-disaster recovery.
• Integrate individual bridge fragility curve, network science, and Monte
Carlo simulation in decision making.
• Demonstrate the proposed methodologies with both hypothetical and
real-world regional transportation networks.
The study has important academic contribution and implications in measur-
ing resilience of transportation systems and pre-disaster mitigation, disaster
response and long-term recovery for transportation systems under extreme
events. With the proposed methodology, the researchers and practitioners are
able to prepare strategic mitigation plans for transportation infrastructure sys-
tems, and to model post-earthquake performance of transportation systems.
The findings are beneficial for government agencies and emergency managers
to evaluate the performance of transportation systems and estimate losses in-
duced from damaged bridges or road closures, to improve the systems’ disaster
resilience under economic constraints, and to evaluate the contingency plans
for transportation management.
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1.3. Organization of dissertation
The remaining dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the au-
thor proposes a resilience-based framework for mitigating risk to surface road
transportation networks. This study utilizes recent developments in modern
network theory to introduce a novel metric based on system reliability and
network connectivity to measure resilience-based performance of a road trans-
portation network. The formulation of this resilience-based performance met-
ric (referred in the chapter as WIPW), systematically integrates the network
topology, redundancy level, traffic patterns, structural reliability of network
components (i.e., roads and bridges) and functionality of the network during
community’s post-disaster recovery, and permits risk mitigation alternatives
for improving transportation network resilience to be compared on a com-
mon basis. Using the WIPW as a network performance metric, the author
proposes a project ranking mechanism for identifying and prioritizing trans-
portation network retrofit projects that are critical for effective pre-disaster
risk mitigation and resilience planning. The author further presents a deci-
sion methodology to select optimal solutions among possible alternatives of
new construction, which offer opportunities to improve the resilience of the
network by altering its existing topology. Finally, this research concludes with
an illustration that uses the WIPW as the performance metric to support
resilience-based risk mitigation decisions using a hypothetical bridge network
susceptible to seismic hazards.
Chapter 3 presents a novel resilience-based framework to optimize the schedul-
ing of the post-disaster recovery actions for road-bridge transportation net-
works. The methodology systematically incorporates network topology, re-
6
dundancy, traffic, damage level and available resources into the stochastic
processes of network post-hazard recovery strategy optimisation. Two metrics
are proposed for measuring rapidity and efficiency of the network recovery:
total recovery time (TRT) and the skew of the recovery trajectory (SRT). The
TRT is the time required for the network to be restored to its pre-hazard
functionality level, while the SRT is a metric defined for the first time in this
chapter to capture the characteristics of the recovery trajectory that relates
to the efficiency of those restoration strategies considered. Based on this two-
dimensional metric, a restoration scheduling method is proposed for optimal
post-disaster recovery planning for bridge-road transportation networks. To
illustrate the proposed methodology, a genetic algorithm is used to solve the
restoration schedule optimisation problem for a hypothetical bridge network
with 30 nodes and 37 bridges subjected to a scenario seismic event. A sensi-
tivity study using this network illustrates the impact of the resourcefulness of
a community and its time-dependent commitment of resources on the network
recovery time and trajectory.
Chapter 4 introduces a comprehensive stage-wise decision framework to sup-
port resilience planning for roadway networks regarding pre-disaster mitigation
(Stage I), post-disaster emergency response (Stage II) and long-term recovery
(Stage III). Three decision metrics are first defined, each based on a derivation
of the number of independent pathways (IPW) within a roadway system, to
measure the performance of a network in term of its robustness, redundancy,
and recoverability, respectively. Using the three IPW-based decision metrics,
a stage-wise decision process is then formulated as a stochastic multi-objective
optimization problem, which includes a project ranking mechanism to identify
7
pre-disaster network retrofit projects in Phase I, a prioritization approach for
temporary repairs to facilitate immediate post-disaster emergency responses
in Phase II, and a methodology for scheduling network-wide repairs during the
long-term recovery of the roadway system in Phase III. Finally, this stage-wise
decision framework is applied to the roadway network of Shelby County, TN,
USA subjected to seismic hazards, to illustrate its implementation in support-
ing community network resilience planning.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the entire dissertation and future work.
8
Chapter 2
Resilience-based risk mitigation
for road networks
2.1. Introduction
The resilience of a system is its ability to withstand or adapt to external shocks
and to recover from such shocks efficiently and effectively [83, 71]. In the case
of civil infrastructure, resilience is often associated with four attributes [14, 19]:
robustness - the ability to withstand an extreme event and deliver a certain
level of service even after the occurrence of that event; rapidity - the ability
to recover the desired functionality as quickly as possible; redundancy - the
extent to which elements and components of a system can be substituted for
one another; and resourcefulness - the capacity to identify problems, establish
priorities, and mobilize personnel and financial resources after an extreme
event. These attributes are illustrated in Figure 2.1; all are characterized by
considerable uncertainties. Many research studies have discussed the resilience
9
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the Concept of Resilience
of systems other than civil infrastructure, including ecosystems [44, 86, 55],
computer networks [78], communication networks[80, 99], and socio-economic
systems [73, 57].
2.2. Literature review
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, any resilience-based analysis and decision re-
quire a quantitative measure of the system performance and condition (i.e.
the vertical coordination in Figure 2.2). While structural reliability (failure
probability) is a well-accepted performance measure for individual roads and
bridges to natural hazards, the performance of a transportation network must
be measured by different metrics. Many researchers have quantified network
performance based on network service functions, e.g., flow capacity [64, 54],
connectivity [20, 27, 41, 11, 52], and travel time [5, 21, 91]. However, these
10
metrics are mainly used to measure network performance under normal ser-
vice conditions and are not effective in reflecting the network susceptibility to
disruptive, low-probability high-consequence natural and man-made hazards
or its resilience (earthquakes, floods, terrorist attacks, etc.). More recently,
Peeta et al. [70] used post-disaster connectivity and traversal cost between
multiple origin-destination pairs in a network as the basis for pre-disaster in-
vestment decisions; Morlok and Chang [62] proposed capacity flexibility to
reflect a transportation systems ability to adapt to changes in traffic patterns
caused by natural disasters; Chang and Nojima [18] introduced the notion of
network coverage and transport accessibility as the performance measures for
post-disaster network recovery; and Ip and Wang [45] suggested that pathway
redundancy between all origin-destination pairs be used as a resilience measure
for transportation networks. These performance metrics all have their mer-
its in quantifying the network performance under hazardous conditions, but
none of them directly reflect the network resilience-based performance in terms
of its ability to provide functionality to community following a disaster and
to support the community recovery from hazard-induced interruptions. Fur-
thermore, none of these studies have attempted to quantify the uncertainties
associated with these performance metrics.
2.3. Highlights
This chapter proposes a novel resilience-based performance metric for road
transportation networks, which allows resilience-based risk mitigation alter-
natives to be measured and compared on a common basis. The performance
metric is based on graph theory, in a formulation which systematically inte-
11
Figure 2.2
grates the network topology, system redundancy, traffic patterns, reliability
(failure probability) of network components (i.e. bridges and roads) and the
network functionality in a community’s immediate post-disaster recovery pe-
riod. Based on this resilience-based performance metric, the author next in-
troduces a project ranking mechanism for identifying and prioritizing bridge
retrofit projects that are critical for effective pre-disaster risk mitigation of road
transportation networks. This investigation provides a decision methodology
to select optimal solutions among possible alternatives of new construction
which offer opportunities to improve network resilience by altering its exist-
ing topology. This chapter concludes with an illustration of a resilience-based
risk mitigation framework, considering a hypothetical networked system of 37
bridges that are susceptible to seismic hazard.
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2.4. Resilience-based network performance met-
ric, WIPW
The fundamental purpose of a transportation system is to carry traffic from
origins to destinations. The resilience of such a system is reflected in its ability
to continue to fulfill this purpose in the event of natural or man-made disasters.
Extreme hazard events can damage many bridges and roads simultaneously
in a local transportation network, and financial and human resources required
to restore the network function often are not immediately available following
the disaster. Thus, the existence of redundant alternative paths between net-
work origin-destination (O-D) pairs is crucial for the continued function of the
transportation system during the period of emergency response immediately
following the disaster as well as the long-term recovery of the community, and
is an essential characteristic of a resilient transportation network.
Accordingly, by extending the concept suggested by Ip and Wang (2011), this
author defines a resilience-based performance metric of a transportation sys-
tem as the weighted average number of reliable independent pathways (WIPW)
between any network O-D pairs. A pathway between an O-D pair usually con-
sists of several links that represent roads, with or without a bridge, which are
connected in series. Two pathways between the same O-D pair are considered
as independent pathways (IPW) if they do not share any common road links.
Although the number of pathways between an O-D pair can be very large, the
number of IPWs is often very limited. The process of identifying all IPWs in
a transportation network will be discussed later. Note that IPWs for different
O-D pairs or even between a same O-D pair may not have identical impacts
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on the network performance. The resilience-based performance metric, as for-
mulated subsequently and referred as WIPW, includes a novel and systematic
weighting mechanism to quantitatively reflect the contribution of each IPW
to the overall network performance under hazard consideration.
Introducing the terminology of graph theory [38], let G = (V,A) denote the
road network, where V = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of nodes that represents major
road intersections and economic hubs and key destinations in a community,
and A = {1, 2, ...,m} is the set of arcs that represent roads either without a
bridge or with a maximum of one bridge. The network performance metric,
WIPW , as defined above, can be written as,
WIPW (G) =
n∑
i=1
wiri, (2.1)
where wi is the weighting factor applied to individual node i ∈ V ,
∑n
i=1wi = 1,
and ri denotes the average number of reliable IPWs between node i and any
other n− 1 nodes in the network, as expressed in Eq. (2.2),
ri =
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
K(i,j)∑
k=1
wk(i, j)Rk(i, j) (2.2)
in which K(i,j) represents total number of IPWs between nodes i and j; Rk(i, j)
is the reliability of IPW Pk(i, j); the kth IPW between node i and j; wk(i, j)
denotes the weighting factor applied to IPW Pk(i, j), and for all K(i,j) IPWs
between nodes i and j,
∑K(i,j)
k=1 wk(i, j) = K(i,j). Weighting facotrs wi and
wk(i, j) will be discussed in details below. Each IPW, Pk(i, j), usually consists
14
of several road links connected in series. Let l denote the individual road links
and ql denote the reliability of l; thus, for a series that consists of independent
links, the system reliability of the series is the product of the reliabilities of all
road links included in Pk(i, j),
Rk =
∏
∀l∈Pk(i,j)
ql (2.3)
For a system in which the component performance are positively correlated,
which is likely the case for transportation networks (further discussion is pro-
vided in Section 2.5), Eq. (2.3) provides a lower bound on system reliability.
The exact system reliability Rk(i, j) can be estimated through Monte Carlo
simulation using a Gaussian Copula to model correlation. Combining Eqs.
(2.1) and (2.2), the resilience-based performance metric of the road network,
WIPW , becomes,
WIPW (G) =
n∑
i=1
wi
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
K(i,j)∑
k=1
wk(i, j)Rk(i, j). (2.4)
Two weighting factors, wi and wk(i, j), appear in Eq. (2.4). Factor wi applies
to nodes; it is inversely proportional to the shortest distance from node i to the
nearest emergency response facility in the community, reflecting the relative
importance of the node i being connected in the context of community post-
disaster emergency response. Let E, a subset of V , denote the set of nodes
in the network where emergency response facilities are located, N the set of
nodes that do not belong to E, and LPk(i,j∈E) is equal to the length of Pk(i, j)
where j ∈ E. wi is evaluated as,
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wi =
ωi∑n
j=1 ωi
(2.5)
where
ωi =

1
min{LPk(i,j∈E)|k=1,2...K(i,j∈E)}
, i ∈ N
1, i ∈ E
∀i ∈ V. (2.6)
As noted previously, the sum of wi for all the nodes in the network equals 1.
The other weighting factor wi in Eq. (2.4) applies to IPWs; it is related to both
the average daily traffic (ADT) and the length of the IPW, and reflects the
relative impact that this pathway has on people’s normal life activities and the
local economy. Pathways between any given O-D pair that has shorter length
and carries larger traffic flow contribute more to the network functionality and
should be weighted more heavily in quantifying the network resilience. ADT
data is often readily available with federal, state or local bridges owners, or can
be estimated using traffic assignment models. Let Ti denote the ADT of road
link l ∈ Pk(i, j). Define TPk(i,j), the ADT of IPW Pk(i, j), as the minimum
ADT of all road links on that pathway:
TPk(i,j) = min[Tl|l ∈ Pk(i, j)] (2.7)
The normalized ADT of the path is then defined as,
T ′Pk(i,j) =
TPk(i,j)∑K(i,j)
k=1 TPk(i,j)
K(i,j) (2.8)
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Note that for any node pair (i, j),
∑Kij
k=1 T
′
Pk(i,j)
= K(i,j). Similarly, let Ll
denote the length of the road link l; then the length of the IPW Pk(i, j) is
simply the summation of the lengths of all road links within that path,
L′Pk(i,j) =
∑
l∈Pk(i,j)
Ll (2.9)
Finally, let Lmax(i, j) denote the maximum of all LPk(i,j) for a given O-D pair
(i, j); the the normalized length of the path is,
L′Pk(i,j) =
Lmax(i, j)
LPk(i,j)
∑K(i,j)
k=1 (Lmax(i, j)/LPk(i,j))
K(i,j) (2.10)
Note that for any node pair (i, j),
∑K(i,j)
k=1 L
′
Pk(i,j)
= K(i,j). Using Eqs. (2.8)
and (2.10), the aggregated pathway weighting factor wk(i, j) is defined as,
wk(i, j) = uL
′
Pk(i,j)
+ (1− u)T ′Pk(i,j) (2.11)
where u ∈ [0, 1] is a weighting factor to impose the relative importance be-
tween the pathway length and its ADT. A community (or government decision
makers) can assign different valus to u based on their preferences in order to
obtain the “best” measure to their specific situation. For the illustration pre-
sented in the subsequent section, uniform weights are applied, i.e., u = 0.5.
Note that the summation of all wk(i, j) for a given O-D pair (i, j) equals K(i,j),
the total number of IPWs between nodes i and j.
The node weighing factor and IPW weighting factor, so defined, not only
ensure that all nodes and links in the network are properly weighted in the
resilience-based performance metric based on their individual attributes (topol-
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ogy, traffic patterns, and functionality during a community’s post-disaster re-
covery as well as structural reliability of individual bridges), but also preserve
the physical meaning of the metric WIPW - the weighted average number of
reliable IPWs between all O-D pairs in the road network. The role that a
transportation system plays before, during and after a disaster varies uniquely
for every community. Communities of different size, population and social-
economic attitudes and vulnerabilities are likely to show different values and
preferences when evaluating the performance of their transportation systems.
The weighting mechanism, formulated as above, provide a transparent frame-
work to incorporate and properly weigh other network attributes in addition
to those discussed herein that might be valuable to a specific community.
Figure 2.3 displays the algorithm for computing WIPW. The identification of
IPWs between many O-D pairs is non-unique, depending on the algorithm or
process used to search for IPWs. To mitigate this problem, the author applies
Dijkstra’s algorithm [79], as highlighted in Figure 2.3 with a dashed-line box,
to search for a succession of independent shortest paths.
2.5. Reliability of bridges in a community trans-
portation system
An important step to quantify the WIPW is to properly assign link (i.e. road
segments with or without a bridge) reliabilities. The reliability of an individ-
ual bridge or road segment can be evaluated using fragility analyses associated
with damage states of interest (e.g. using platform HAZUS-MH MR4 [33]).
The calculated WIPW is therefore hazard-specific because the link reliabili-
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Figure 2.3: Evaluation of network resilience-based performance metric, WIPW
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ties are hazard specific. It should be recognized that hazardous events with
large footprints introduce spatial and temporal correlations to the demands
on community infrastructure systems [2, 46]. Common construction practices
and code enforcement within a community also introduce positive correlation
in structural response above and beyond that introduced by the hazard [85, 13].
Such correlation structures depend on the stochastic variability in the hazard
demand, the locations of bridges and roads, and their susceptibility to damage
if the hazardous event occurs, and need to be taken into consideration in the
probabilistic evaluation of the network performance [53, 11].
Bridge fragility assessment is an important ingredient for seismic risk assess-
ment of transportation infrastructure [68]. The current research is focused on
transportation network performance assessment. Because such networks may
contain many different types of bridges, bridge fragility modeling is outside the
scope of the current effort. However, a practical assessment of the integrity of
any transportation network should contain specific fragility models for the key
bridges in the network. In the subsequent examples, the author uses plausible
estimates of failure probabilities for generic bridge types.
2.6. Formulation of optimal risk mitigation strate-
gies
The quantitative resilience-based performance metric, WIPW, as formulated
in Section 2.4, can be employed to evaluate the transportation network per-
formance, and it can also be incorporated in a decision framework to pro-
vide a common basis for evaluating and comparing alternative risk mitigation
20
strategies on a common and rational basis. Possible pre-disaster risk mitiga-
tion strategies to improve road network resilience include retrofitting existing
bridges (links) or building new bridges. In either case, the formulation of the
decision process is the same: to make selections from a set of candidate links,
representing either existing bridges and road segments or potential new con-
struction, to maximize the network performance WIPW and, simultaneously,
to minimize the associated cost.
Suppose the set of candidates is represented by S = {s1, s2, ..., ss} and the
corresponding cost of each is c = {c1, c2, ..., cs}. Let xt ∈ X, where t =
1, 2, ..., s, denote the decision variables as below,
xt =

1, st ∈ S is selected
0, otherwise
. (2.12)
Since the risk mitigation strategy (or decision) represented by X will upgrade
the existing network, all the parameters of the upgraded network are rewrote
in the form of argument X, e.g., WIPW (G(X)), wi(X), ri and Pk(i, j|X).
Furthermore, some network parameters are uncertain and can be treated as
random variables in the problem formulation; these variables will be repre-
sented with argument ξ. Thus, the first objective of the decision process is to
maximize the network performance metric WIPW:
max WIPW (G(X, ξ)) =
n∑
i=1
wi(X)ri(X, ξ) (2.13)
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Let θ denote the cost associated with decision X; the second objective function
is to minimize the total cost:
min θ(X, ξ) =
s∑
t=1
ct(ξ)xt (2.14)
Eqs. (2.13) and (2.14) pose a nontrivial multi-objective optimization problem,
and a single solution that simultaneously optimizes these two competing ob-
jectives, i.e., maximizes WIPW and minimizes cost associated with mitigation
strategies, does not exist. However, a (possibly infinite) number of Pareto-
optimal solutions do exist, which allows the tradeoff between the competing
objectives and the subjective preferences of a decision maker to be factored
into the decision process. To compute the objective function of Eq. (2.13)
requires the algorithm described in Figure 2.3, a non-closed form formulation,
which requires metaheuristic techniques to search for near-optimal solutions.
Accordingly, this research uses a Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II
(NSGA-II) [32] to search for the Pareto frontier; NSGA-II have been success-
fully applied to search for near-optimal solutions of similar network problems
[72, 59, 50]. GA is couped with Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) to take uncer-
tainties into consideration in the optimization process in the subsequent case
study. Since the parameter values have significant effects on the performance
of the NSGA-II [34], rigorous tests on parameter tuning are performed, result-
ing in the mutation parameter, crossover rate and population size in the GA
to be set to 0.1, 0.7 and 100, respectively. The maximum number of iterations
is 1,000, and the early termination criterion is 50, which means the program
will stop if no better solution is found in consecutive 50 iterations.
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2.7. Illustration - risk-based mitigation decisions
of transportation network exposed to seis-
mic hazards
In this section, the role of the network resilience-based performance metric
and the application of the decision methodology for risk mitigation are illus-
trated with a hypothetical road network exposed to a severe earthquake. Two
scenarios are discussed: (1) establishing priorities for pre-disaster retrofitting
bridges that are critical for transportation network resilience; and (2) selecting
among possible alternatives of new constructions which offer opportunities to
improve the resilience of the network by altering its existing topology.
2.7.1 Road/bridge network
Figure 2.4 illustrates a hypothetical community road system, with 37 links
representing the roads and 30 nodes representing the major road intersections
and economic hubs. The community emergency response facilities (e.g. fire
stations, hospitals, police, etc.) are located at Nodes 9 and 17. For simplicity,
every road is assumed to contain exactly one bridge. This assumption can be
easily relaxed, if necessary. If all the bridges in the network are in “as new”
condition and reliabilities under service loads are assumed equal to 0.999,
the upper bound of WIPW is 1.70, which means that on average there are
1.70 reliable IPW between any O-D pair in the road network under normal
operational conditions.
It is assumed that a severe earthquake occurs, with magnitude MW equal to 7
23
45
7
12
18
22
15
29
24
261
2
3
9
13
16
8
27
23
21
10
6
11
17
14
20
19
30
25
28
1
2
4
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17 18
19
20
21
23
22
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
36
37
1 -- Node index; 1--Bridge index;
Emergency response facilities Other	nodes 35
Figure 2.4: Hypothetical bridge network
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and epicentral distance approximately 40 km from the centroid of the network
(close to Node 13). For illustrative purposes, it is assumed that out of the 37
bridges, 19 are steel (S) bridges and 18 are reinforced concrete (RC) bridges.
To reflect the diversity of bridge construction (including bridge configuration,
material and area) within the network, it is assumed that the mean reliabilities
of the 19 steel bridges and 17 RC bridges under the considered seismic action
are 0.75 and 0.65, respectively. Furthermore, to reflect the epistemic uncer-
tainty associated with the estimate of bridge reliability, the reliability for each
bridge is described by a normal distribution, with a mean value as tabulated in
Table 2.1 and a coefficient of variation of 0.07 for all bridges; the implication of
this assumption, often made in probabilistic risk analysis, is that the reliability
of each bridge in this system can be estimated to be within ±15% with more
than 95% confidence. This modeling approach results in a bridge portfolio
that represents a diversity of construction practices. Correlations exist in the
demand and capacity of these bridges as discussed in Section 2.5 due to com-
mon hazard and similar construction code and practices. These correlations
are modeled as exponentially decreasing with the increase in the separation
distance between bridges, i.e. ρij = exp(−aij/Lc), where aij is the separation
distance between bridges i and j, and Lc is the correlation length which is set
to be the largest distance between two bridges in the network. This simple cor-
relation model reflects the fact that correlation in bridge performance due to
both seismic demand and common construction practices is likely to diminish
as their separation distance increases. In addition, the retrofit cost for each
bridge is also modeled with a normal distribution, assuming that the mean
cost is a function of the bridge deck area and its structural reliability [36],
and coefficient of variation is 8%. The mean reliability, mean retrofit cost and
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mean ADT of each bridge are tabulated in Table 2.1. The distributions used
to model the uncertainty associated with these parameters are summarized in
Table 2.2.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the histogram of the network WIPW under the con-
sidered hazard scenario, obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations of the
network performance, which was found through experimentation to yield a
stable estimate of the mean WIPW. The mean residual WIPW of the current
network without any risk mitigation actions is 0.61, and its coefficient of vari-
ation (COV) is 0.22. That is, if the scenario earthquake were to occur, the
average number of weighted independent pathways between all O-D pairs is
less than 1, meaning that some areas in the community will become isolated
from one another following the scenario earthquake. This analysis provides
a baseline for comparing the effectiveness of the alternative risk mitigation
strategies to be evaluated in the subsequent section.
2.7.2 Improving network resilience by strengthening crit-
ical bridges
When only limited resources are available for risk mitigation aimed at achiev-
ing a more resilient network through bridge retrofitting, it is critical to dis-
tribute those resources within the network in such a way that the overall
network performance is maximized. Since there are 37 bridges in the network
and each can be either selected or not selected for retrofit, the solution space
has different combinations. As discussed previously, the GA is used to solve
this multi-objective optimization problem as formulated in Section 2.6. It is
assumed that a retrofit intervention will bring the reliability of a bridge back
26
Table 2.1: Mean values of network parameters
Bridge ID Construction Type Reliability ADT (Vehicle/Hour) Cost (Unit)
1 RC 0.66 2200 3.57
2 RC 0.76 1900 3.82
3 S 0.82 2000 4.34
4 S 0.88 1500 4.17
5 RC 0.55 1900 4.87
6 S 0.84 2200 3.49
7 S 0.77 700 4.41
8 S 0.82 2400 3.74
9 S 0.77 2600 2.61
10 S 0.85 300 3.55
11 S 0.84 800 2.53
12 RC 0.71 900 5.29
13 S 0.89 2500 4.78
14 S 0.78 600 3.25
15 RC 0.77 2000 3.43
16 S 0.78 500 4.33
17 RC 0.61 2500 3.14
18 RC 0.79 2800 2.98
19 S 0.8 1300 2.88
20 S 0.75 1700 3.28
21 S 0.89 1500 3.98
22 S 0.81 1200 4.82
23 RC 0.76 1500 3.24
24 S 0.75 700 4.8
25 S 0.78 1800 3.8
26 S 0.75 900 4.66
27 S 0.8 600 4.46
28 RC 0.71 800 3.33
29 RC 0.65 1400 4.86
30 RC 0.67 2800 3.45
31 RC 0.69 1900 3.08
32 RC 0.75 2900 3.74
33 RC 0.79 1300 4.5
34 RC 0.69 900 4.47
35 RC 0.72 2200 3.36
36 RC 0.83 700 4.46
37 RC 0.73 3000 5.15
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Table 2.2: Statistics of network parameters
Parameters Notation Distribution Mean COV
Individual Bridge Reliability q Normal In Table 2.1 0.07
Average Daily Traffic (ADT) T Uniform In Table 2.1 0.05
Retrofit Cost c Normal In Table 2.1 0.08
Figure 2.5: Histogram of network WIPW before Retrofit
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to 0.999, the “as new” condition.
Figure 2.6 shows the tradeoff between network performance and financial in-
vestment in risk mitigation, with the triangular markers representing the col-
lection of optimal solutions (Pareto Frontier) when WIPW and retrofitting cost
(measured in non-dimensional cost units) are considered as competing objec-
tives. With a total of 150 cost units, the alternative shown at the top right
corner of the Figure 5 selects all 37 bridges for retrofit and the corresponding
network WIPW increases to the pre-earthquake value of 1.7, as all bridges are
upgraded to the “near-perfect” hazard-resilient condition. Four solutions on
the Pareto Frontier, marked as I, II, III and IV in Figure 2.6, are identified in
Figure 2.3 for further examination. Generally speaking, a larger financial in-
vestment will lead to more bridges being selected for retrofit and, consequently,
a more resilient network. For instance, Solution I identifies seven bridges in the
network as having retrofit priority, with a budget of 25 cost units, resulting a
network WIPW of 0.76. In contrast, Solution III indicates that with a budget
of 86 cost units, 22 bridges can be selected for retrofit, leading to a WIPW
of 1.23, which is a 101% increase over the pre-retrofit WIPW of 0.61. Figure
2.7 compares the network WIPW before and after the retrofit associated with
Solution III when uncertainties are considered in the evaluation.
Table 2.3 reveals that the increase in the number of selected bridges from Solu-
tion I to Solution IV is not simply due to adding more bridges to the selected
group associated with a lower budget. The likelihood of some bridges, e.g.
bridges 11 and 13, being selected increases as the budget increases. Other
bridges, e.g. bridges 4 and 33, are selected initially when the budget is low;
however, they are deselected as the budget increases because a neighboring
29
Figure 2.6: Pareto Frontier of Optimal Solutions
bridge on an alternative path may become a more cost-effective candidate for
improving the overall network resilience. Finally, bridges 5 and 17 are al-
ways selected in optimal retrofit solutions because, when compared with other
bridges, they both: 1) have much lower than average structural reliabilities
(0.55 and 0.61); 2) carry heavy ADT (1,900 and 2,500); 3) are shared by IPWs
between multiple node-pairs; and 4) are in close proximity to emergency re-
sponse facilities. This dynamic prioritization mechanism holistically integrates
the network characteristics and individual bridge properties in resilience-based
decision for the road network.
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Table 2.3: Details of four optimal solutions in Pareto frontier
Solution ID Cost Mean WIPW # of bridges Bridges selected
I 25 0.76 7 5,17,8,32,10,4,33
II 62 1.07 14 22, 5, 28, 17, 20, 14, 12, 19, 27,15, 24, 16, 36, 21, 37, 31
III
86 1.24 22 27, 11, 19, 16, 10, 31, 5, 17, 18,
37, 23, 30, 28, 14, 12, 24, 21,
22, 29, 36, 15, 20
IV
107 1.51 27 7, 6, 11, 19, 27, 31, 1, 5, 17, 8,
18, 37, 25, 26, 23, 30, 28, 14, 2,
24, 21, 35, 22, 29, 36, 20, 13
Figure 2.7: Comparison of Network Resilience before and after Retrofit (Solu-
tion III)
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2.7.3 Improving network resilience by changing network
topology through new construction
Opportunities may exist in a developing community to improve the resilience
of the existing transportation network by altering its topology through new
construction. For example, the hypothetical road network considered herein
has two obvious areas of potential weakness as far as resilience is concerned.
The first weakness is the branch from node 19 to node 28, highlighted with
thickened lines in Figure 2.8, where four bridges - 26, 30, 36, and 37- are
connected in series to the rest of the network through node 19. If any of the
four bridges fail due to the earthquake, the area to the east of that bridge will
be isolated from the rest of the community because an alternative path does
not exist. The second weakness is if both bridges 18 and 19 fail, the entire
community road system will be divided into two unconnected subsystems, and
the resilience of the road system will instantly drop to 0.39. Relieving the
burden on these two bridges by creating bypasses will increase the overall
resilience of the network.
Suppose that as part of community development, Links S1-S5, shown by
dashed lines on Figure 2.8, are possible candidates for construction to mit-
igate the above-mention potential risks. Suppose, further, that resources are
available to construct only two additional roads out of the five candidates:
one road to be selected from S1, S2, or S3 is to increase the connectivity of
the branch from node 19 to node 28, and one road to be selected from S4 or
S5 to relief the burden on roads 18 and 19. The decision method outlined
in Section 5 is applied to select alternatives that will most enhance the over-
all resilience of the road network. Table 2.4 lists the mean and percentage
32
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Figure 2.8: Hypothetical Bridge Network with Candidates for New Construc-
tion
increase of the network resilience for each combination of possible selections.
While all possible solutions improve the overall network resilience significantly,
the combination of S2+S4 is most effective, with a 72.3% increase in network
resilience from 0.61 to 1.05.
2.8. Summary
This chapter has introduced a quantitative metric based on graph theory to
measure resilience of a road/bridge network which permits risk mitigation
alternatives for improving the resilience of transportation system to be evalu-
ated and compared on a common basis. The method systematically integrates
the network topology, redundancy level, traffic patterns, location of commu-
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Table 2.4: Impact of New Construction on Network Resilience
Possible combinations Mean of resilience Increase in resilience
S1+ S4 1.03 68.80%
S1+ S5 0.88 44.30%
S2+ S4 1.05 72.30%
S2+ S5 0.89 45.90%
S3+ S4 1.01 65.60%
S3+ S5 0.85 39.30%
nity emergency response facilities as well as failure probability of individual
bridges, into the resilience indicator. Resilience analysis suggests that network
resilience can be improved by increasing reliabilities of critical bridges through
appropriate retrofitting, optimizing network topology through new construc-
tion, by altering traffic flow patterns through appropriate routing policies,
and by strategically allocating emergency response facilities. However, the
role that the transportation system plays before, during, and after a disaster
will be unique for each community. Stakeholders of communities of differ-
ent sizes, populations and social-economic vulnerabilities and support systems
are likely to reveal different values and preferences in evaluating resilience of
their transportation systems. The resilience indicator proposed in this chap-
ter provides a transparent framework for incorporating other attributes in
addition to those discussed herein by adjusting the weights in the network
resilience quantification. The proposed decision framework for effective risk
mitigation through bridge retrofitting or new construction is formulated as a
multi-objective optimization problem, which allows tradeoffs to be made be-
tween competing resilience and cost objectives and the subjective preferences
of a decision maker to be factored in decision process.
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Chapter 3
Resilience-based post-disaster
recovery strategies for road-bridge
networks
3.1. Introduction
A well-accepted definition of infrastructure system resilience is presented in
[14], as illustrated in Figure 2.1, Several approaches to quantify resilience can
be found in Bruneau et al. [14], Chang and Shinozuka [19], Cimellaro et al.
[24, 25, 26], Zobel [101], Bocchini et al. [12]. Numerous studies have been fo-
cused on the post-hazard restoration of physical networks. For example, Chang
and Nojima [18] utilized network coverage and transport accessibility to quan-
tify the post-disaster performance of a transportation network and applied
these concepts to a rail and highway transportation system in Kobe, Japan.
Shinozuka et al. [77] discussed the restoration curve in terms of robustness and
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rapidity in which the recovery indicator is associated with the service level (e.g.
power supply for electric networks or water supply for water systems) and the
rapidity is measured by the average recovery rate, expressed in percentage re-
covery/time. Wang et al. [87] constructed a depot location model to minimize
the total inter-cell transportation cost for the electric power restoration pro-
cess. Çağnan et al. [15] compared the alternative restoration strategies for the
electric power transmission systems with respect to the expected duration of
power outages in Los Angeles using a discrete-event simulation model. The
study by Xu et al. [88] of an electric system was aimed at minimizing the area
above the restoration curve; this area, shown in Figure 2.1 as the light-shaded
triangular area, is named the resilience triangle in Bruneau et al. [14]. Miles
and Chang [60] proposed one of the first comprehensive concept models of
post-disaster community recovery using an object-oriented design technique,
in which the variables and relationships between different sectors were clearly
defined. Their model provides a common basis for developing computer models
of socioeconomic recovery from disasters and its flexibility allows for the incor-
poration of various indicators and algorithms within the framework, and was
implemented successfully in a prototype computer simulation with a graphical
user interface. Karlaftis et al. [49] developed a three-stage approach to allocate
available resources to the restoration of a transportation system in terms of
the contribution of each bridge to the operation of the network. Frangopol and
Bocchini [37] optimized the post-disaster restoration schedule for a transporta-
tion system with respect to total cost and resilience, the definition of which
is the area below the recovery trajectory (the dark-shaded trapezoid shown in
Figure 2.1) using total travel time and total travel distance as the network per-
formance metrics. In a later study [10], the authors added the time required to
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recover a certain level of network functionality (less than complete recovery)
as another objective in optimizing the network restoration schedule. More
recently, Karamlou and Bocchini [48] proposed a multi-objective optimization
model to maximize the network resilience and minimize the required time to
connect critical nodes (e.g., healthcare facilities and operations centers) in the
network.
The network performance metrics used in post-disaster recovery in the stud-
ies as reviewed above include rapidity (recovery time), monetary loss (user
cost), service performance (travel time and travel distance), and area under
the recovery curve; however, no methods could be located which focus on the
shape of the recovery trajectory. The shape, however, provides additional in-
formation and a novel perspective on the efficiency of the network restoration
process. For example, as shown in Figure 4.6, the four recovery trajectories
share the same rapidity, i.e. recovery time. Assuming equal levels of commu-
nity investment, curve 1 represents the best recovery strategy and curve 4 is the
worst among all the alternatives. Furthermore, recovery curve 2 is better than
curve 3 due to its more efficient early-stage recovery which reduces early losses
caused by network service disruption. This efficiency in early phase of recovery
could also facilitate the recovery of other infrastructure systems whose service
capabilities highly depend on the functionality of transportation network (e.g.
emergency response and rescue immediately following hazard event). To the
best of our knowledge, the existing network recovery scheduling frameworks
are generally not capable of distinguishing recovery trajectories 2 and 3. While
Bocchini and Frangopol [10] proposed to use the time required for network to
recovery to a pre-defined level of functionality as an additional measure to
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Figure 3.1: Recovery trajectories
evaluate the efficiency of the recovery process, that proposal still leaves curves
2 and 3 indistinguishable if the prescribed function level is close to the inter-
section point of the two curves.
3.2. Highlight contributions
In this chapter, the author first introduces a novel metric for evaluating the rel-
ative efficiency of alternative network recovery strategies. This chapter then
develops a restoration scheduling methodology for network post-disaster re-
covery that minimizes the overall network recovery time and optimizes the
recovery trajectory, which ultimately will reduce economic losses due to net-
work service disruption. In the proposed method, the number of simultaneous
repair interventions (actions) is constrained by the available resources in the
community throughout the recovery period. In addition, this model dynami-
38
cally updates the damage level of each individual bridge and the corresponding
overall performance of the network during the recovery process until all the
damaged bridges are restored. The restoration scheduling model is stochastic
in nature because the uncertainties associated with parameters that are crit-
ical for network recovery, e.g. the restoration intervention duration for each
damaged bridge and traffic flow on roads and bridges, are propagated through-
out the analysis. The optimization problem in this study is formulated as a
version of the dynamic job shop problem, which is known to be NP-hard [40].
Genetic algorithm (GA) implementation is used to search for near-optimal so-
lutions efficiently. Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) is employed to sample the
stochastic parameters to quantify the uncertainties associated with network
recovery process.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.3 introduces the
resilience-based transportation network performance metric used in this study.
In section 3.4, the author defines the metrics for measuring the efficiency of the
network recovery process, and then develop the mathematical formulation for
resilience-based network recovery optimization. In Section 3.5, a hypothetical
bridge network comprised of 30 nodes and 37 bridges is generated to illustrate
the implementation of the developed methodology in a context of a considered
scenario earthquake. A sensitivity study using this network illustrates the
impact of the resourcefulness of a community and time-dependent commitment
of resources on the network recovery time and trajectory. Conclusions and
future work are summarized in Section 3.6.
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3.3. Resilience-based performance metric of road
networks
Many performance metrics for transportation networks, such as maximum
traffic flow capacity and minimum travel time or distance, can be used to
measure network performance under normal operational conditions, but are
not directly applicable to the analysis of post-disaster recovery following se-
vere natural hazards. Immediately following an extreme event, people typ-
ically are more concerned about whether they are able to travel from one
place to another than the distance or the speed at which they can travel.
Connectivity reliability, as a network performance measure, could address the
above-mentioned deficiencies, but does not reflect the different levels of impor-
tance in the roles that different roads and bridges play in the functionality of
the network. Thus, connectivity reliability does not fully support resilience-
based decisions on engineering interventions that are directly implemented at
the network component (roads and bridges) level. A network performance
metric recently introduced by Zhang and Wang [90] and formulated in the
context of community resilience to natural hazards, uses the weighted average
number of reliable independent pathways between all origin-destination (O-D)
pairs, denoted WIPW, as a performance measure of transportation networks.
This study adopts the WIPW as the network performance metric (the vertical
coordinate of the resilience curves illustrated in Figures 4.6) for optimizing
post-event network recovery scheduling.
Let G = (V,A) denote the road network, where V is the set of nodes, which is
partitioned into a set of E = {1, 2, ..., e} emergency nodes (including critical
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emergency response facilities, e.g. fire stations and hospitals) and a set of
N = {e + 1, e + 2, ..., n} normal nodes (representing major destinations, e.g.
residential areas, economic hubs, and major road intersections); and A =
{1, 2, ...,m} is the set of arcs (links) that represent roads without or with a
maximum of one bridge. The network performance metric, WIPW, is written
as,
WIPW (G) =
n∑
i=1
wi
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
Kij∑
k=0
wk(i, j)Rk(i, j) (3.1)
where K(i,j) is the total number of independent pathways (IPW) between node
i ∈ V and node j 6= i ∈ V ; Pk(i, j) represents the kth IPW between node
i ∈ V and node j 6= i ∈ V , and Rk(i, j) represents the reliability (probability
of surviving a hazard) of Pk(i, j)).The weighting factor wk(i, j) is applied to
Pk(i, j)), which is a function of the average daily traffic (ADT, denoted as Fij
in the subsequent sections) and the length (denoted Lij as in the subsequent
sections) of each arc that is a portion of the Pk(i, j); weighting factor wi is
applied to node i, which is a function of the distance from node i to its nearest
emergency response facilities represented by emergency node e ∈ E. The
detailed formulation of each item in Eq. (3.1) and the complete algorithm to
evaluate WIPW can be found in Chapter 2.
This resilience-based network performance measure encompasses the following
four important characteristics of network resilience: (1) the network redun-
dancy, encapsulated in the term K(i,j) in Eq. (3.1), reflects the number of
alternative or back-up independent paths between all possible O-D pairs. (2)
41
the network component reliability, encapsulated in the term Rk(i, j), relates
to the probability of bridges (and roads) being functional (fully or partially)
after a given hazard event. For example, bridges with a higher reliability are
likely to have less damage and require less time and resources to recover fol-
lowing a disaster; such attributes should be considered in effective network
risk mitigation and recovery strategies. (3) the importance levels of network
components, encapsulated in the term wk(i, j) (as a function of arc ADT and
length) in Eq. (3.1), reflect the different service levels of bridges and roads
in terms of the roles that they play in supporting the overall network func-
tionality. The ADT describes the historical traffic flow on each roadway. It
is more accurate as a roadway importance measure than the traffic pattern
predicted by existing traffic assignment models [30] because the user pattern
of the road system is affected by many factors, including distribution of ori-
gins and destinations, distance and travel time of paths, congestion, facilities
along the path, user preferences, etc.. (4) the role of the transportation net-
work in post-disaster emergency response is considered in the performance
metric, through the term in Eq. (3.1), by applying heavier weights on roads
and bridges that are topologically in close proximity to emergency facilities, as
they likely play important roles in community emergency response and rescue
immediately following the hazard event.
The WIPW was originally introduced as a network performance metric for
pre-event risk mitigation decisions. In adapting the WIPW in this chapter
for network post-disaster recovery scheduling optimization, its formulation in
Eq. (3.1) needs to be modified. Specifically, the pre-event reliability of IPW,
Rk(i, j), must be replaced by its post-event serviceability. The post-event
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service level of an arc (a road segment or a bridge) is a function of its damage
level denoted as qa for a ∈ A, which can be measured on a 0 to 4 scale,
corresponding to the damage levels of none, slight, moderate, extensive and
complete [75]. The author idealizes the service level of each arc a ∈ A to
be (1− qa/4) [10]; i.e, if an arc is fully damaged (“complete” damage state),
qa is set to be 4, and the corresponding service level is 0; otherwise, the arc
service level ranges from 0 to 1. The author further approximates the service
level of the IPW Pk(i, j) as the product of the service levels of all arcs a ∈
Pk(i, j). Accordingly, the WIPW for a damaged transportation network can
be computed as,
WIPW (G) =
n∑
i=1
wi
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
Kij∑
k=0
wk(i, j) min∀a∈Pk(i,j)
(
1− qa
4
)
(3.2)
For post-event recovery scheduling investigated in this chapter, a damaged
transportation network is considered as fully recovered if the network WIPW
computed using Eq. (3.2) returns to its pre-disaster level (without damaged
network components).
3.4. Optimization of network recovery schedul-
ing
This research introduces two metrics for resilience-based network recovery
planning. The first metric is the total recovery time (TRT), tr, after which
the network is restored to its “undamaged” condition (damage level for all arcs
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equals to 0, and network WIPW resumes to its pre-disaster value). As dis-
cussed previously, the TRT alone is not sufficient to evaluate the efficiency of
network recovery strategies which is partially encapsulated in the shape of the
recovery trajectory. For example, Figure 3.2 shows two recovery trajectories as
a function of time resulting from two different network restoration schedules,
where the network performance (vertical axis) is measured by WIPW; R0 and
Rh denote , respectively, the network WIPW before and immediately after the
extreme event. It is obvious that while restoration schedules 1 and 2 lead to
approximately the same network recovery time, schedule 1 is notably more
efficient than schedule 2 with respect to the economic losses incurred due to
interrupted network service during recovery. The author therefore introduces
a second metric for evaluating the effectiveness of network restoration sched-
ules - the skew of the recovery trajectory (SRT), defined as the centroid of
the area below the recovery trajectory (from t0 to tk) with respect to t = t0.
The SRT associated with schedules 1 and 2 are marked in Figure 3.2 as s1
and s2, respectively. If the recovery was instantaneous, s would equal to 0.
This two-dimensional recovery metric, i.e. TRT and SRT, defines the objective
functions in finding the optimal scheduling for the network recovery.
Although the scheduling framework introduced in this chapter applies to any
arc within the network, i.e. both bridges and road segments, the subse-
quent discussion is focused on bridges as they are the most vulnerable arcs
in the transportation network. Let B = {1, 2, ...,m} denote the set of net-
work bridges. The recovery scheduling is to determine an optimal schedule
x = {x1, x2, ..., xd} for the repair of all d ≤ m damaged bridges, where x is the
time at which restoration is initiated for bridges b = 1, ..., d, such that both the
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Figure 3.2: Recovery trajectories
network TRT and SRT are minimized. Let Db denote the duration of restora-
tion intervention for each bridge b = 1, ..., d. The network TRT associated with
the schedule x, tr(x), is then:
tr(x) = max
b=1,2,...,d
(xb +Db)− t0 (3.3)
The network SRT associated with the scheduling plan x, s(x), the centroid of
the area under the recovery trajectory as shown in Figure 3.2, can be calculated
by Eq. (3.4), which requires the integrals of WIPW, i.e., Rt, as a function
of time. As discussed previously computing WIPW involves using Dijkstra’s
algorithm [79] to search for IPWs for all O-D pairs, which cannot be performed
in closed-form. This study therefore estimates WIPW at discrete points in
time; consequently, the recovery trajectory (expressed in terms of WIPW) is
discretized into step functions. The author sets T = {t0, t1, ..., tk} such that
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t0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tk, in which the difference between any adjacent time points is
a constant time increment ∆t . The SRT can then be approximated by:
s(x) =
∫ t0+tk
t0
Rt(t− t0)dt∫ t0+tk
t0
Rtdt
≈
∑k
i=0 tiR(ti)∆t∑k
i=0R(ti)∆t
(3.4)
where tk, set to be larger than any possible TRT, represents a common refer-
ence timeframe for computing SRT for different strategies. During the recovery
phase, the damage level of each bridge b at any time t ∈ T is:
qtb(xb) = qb[t < xb +Db] (3.5)
where [P ] is the Iverson bracket, which returns 1 if P is true, and 0 otherwise.
Eq. (3.5) ensures that the bridge b remains at its initial damage level qb
until its scheduled restoration intervention is completed; its damage level then
becomes 0 after the completion of the intervention (i.e. when t ≥ xb + Db).
This assumption implies that selected lane closure during a bridge restoration
project is not considered. That is, a bridges is not treated as a feasible link in
searching for IPWs in the estimation of WIPW (i.e. R(t) in Eq.(3.4)). At any
given time t ∈ T , the number of simultaneous restoration interventions within
the entire network, denoted by N tSI , can be computed as:
N tSI =
m∑
b=1
[x ≥ xb][t ≤ xb +Db] ≤ NmaxSI (3.6)
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where [P ] is the Iverson bracket as introduced above; NmaxSI denotes the maxi-
mum number of simultaneous restoration interventions in the network allowed
by the human and financial resources available in the community for the re-
covery of the road network following the hazard event. Accordingly, NmaxSI ,
imposes a constraint to the restoration scheduling, and thereby can impact
the overall network recovery characteristics expressed in terms of TRT, tr(x),
and SRT, s(x).
The optimal restoration sequence for all damaged bridges and the time at
which restoration is initiated for each bridge are obtained by minimizing the
network TRT [as defined by Eq. (3.3)] and SRT [as defined by Eq. (3.4)],
under the constraint that only a prescribed maximum number of simultane-
ous restoration actions are possible at any given time [as expressed by Eq.
(3.6)]. The complete optimization model is summarized in Figure 3.3. The
ADT of each roadway [used in calculating the term wk(i, j) in estimating the
WIPW for the damaged network as expressed in Eq. (3.2)] and the duration
of restoration intervention for each bridge are treated as random variables de-
noted, respectively, as Fij(ξ˜) for all (i, j) ∈ A and Db(ξ˜) for all b ∈ B, where ξ
is stochastic variables. The distribution of Fij(ξ˜) can be derived from histori-
cal ADT measurements which are readily available from federal, state or local
bridge owners. Db(ξ˜) is assumed to have a normal distribution with a mean
that is a function of both the damage level (qb) and deck area of the bridge
(Ab) [36]. Realizations of these random variables are denoted as Fij(ξ) and
Db(ξ).
The decision problem under investigation, as formulated in Figure 3.3, is
closely related to the NP-hard parallel machine scheduling problem [56, 84, 23].
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It is assumed that bridge repair scheduling is non preemptive, that is, once
a crew has begun repair on a given bridge, they must complete their work
before moving to another bridge. Additionally, the problem under investiga-
tion is further complicated by the necessary estimation of WIPW which, as
discussed, is computed iteratively through a series of weighted shortest path
problems. Approximation approaches are commonly utilized for addressing
complex scheduling problems (e.g., Cheng and Gen [22]). Accordingly, the
genetic algorithm (GA) is modified for the scheduling problem described in
Goncalves et al. [40] to be applicable in this study to identify the near-optimal
solutions. The classical weighted-sum method [31, 51] is applied to the two
objectives, TRT and SRT, to form a fitness function as below:
min[ctr(x) + (1− c)s(x)] (3.7)
where the author introduces c ∈ [0, 1] as a weighting factor to impose the
relative importance between the two objectives. A community (or government
decision makers) can use different weighting factors based on their preferences,
value and tolerances to different risks in order to obtain the “best” strategy to
their specific situation. For the example presented in the subsequent section,
the work simply applies equal weights to the two objectives for illustration.
It is worth to note that even though the GA is implemented with one fitness
function in the way the author chooses to perform the optimization, there
are alternative approaches to keep the objectives separate, e.g., non-sorting
genetic algorithm II [32]. The optimization process is summarized in Figure
3.4. The stochastic variables (i.e. Fij(ξ˜) and Db(ξ˜) ) are realized using Monte
Carlo Simulation (MCS).
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Description Equations Eq.No. 
Input Parameters 
Network topology: 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐴) 
ADT: 𝐹)* 𝜉 ;	link Length: 𝐿)*	∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴 
Damage level of bridges: 𝑞4 ∈ 0,1,2,3,4 	∀	𝑏 ∈ 𝐵	  
Bridge restoration duration:	𝐷4(𝜁𝑏) ∀	𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 
 
Decision Variables 
Intervention time for 
bridge 𝑏 𝑥 = {𝑥@, 𝑥A, 𝑥B, … , 𝑥D}  
Global Objective 1 
Minimize total 
recovery time 
min	𝑡𝑟 𝒙 = max𝑏=1,2…𝑑(𝑥𝑏 + 𝐷𝑏)-𝑡0 (3.3) 
Global Objective 2 
Minimize skewness 
min 𝑠 𝑥 = 	 𝑡	ℜS∆𝑡S∈U' ℜS∆𝑡	S∈U'  (3.4) 
Global Constraint 1 
Resilience Indicator 
at time 𝑡 ℜ 𝐺 = 	 𝑤) 1𝑛 − 1 𝑤Z 𝑖, 𝑗 min∀[∈\] ),* (1 − 𝑞44 )	^ _,`Zab
c
*a@,*d)
c
)a@ , (3.2) 
Local Constraint 2 
Bridge damage level 
after repair 
𝑞4S 𝑥4 = min	(𝑞4, [𝑥4 + 	𝐷4(𝜁4) > 𝑡]), 𝑏 = 1,2, … , 𝑑,			∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (3.5) 
Local Constraint 3 
Simultaneous 
interventions cannot 
exceed maximum  
𝑡 ≥ 𝑥4 𝑡 ≤ 𝑥4 + 𝐷4 ≤ 𝑁lmnop	,n4a@ 			∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (3.6) 
Local Constraint 5 
Complete recovery 
time 
𝑡q 𝑥 ≥ 	 𝑥4 + 𝐷4(𝜁4), 𝑏 = 1,2, … , 𝑑  
Local Constraint 4 
Variable interval 𝑥4 ≥ 0, 𝑏 = 1,2, … , 𝑑  
	
Figure 3.3: Summary of the realized optimization formulation
49
Population	 generation
Compute the intervention times and 
completion times
Repeat evaluating WIPW until all 
bridges are repaired
Calculate fitness value and 
feasibility
Cr
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and solutions 
Meet the stop criteria? 
Yes
Figure 3.4: Flow chart of genetic algorithm (GA)
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Note that the two objectives, TRT and SRT, represent two very distinct char-
acteristics of the network recovery. Summing the two objectives to form a
fitness function is simply the way the author chooses to solve the optimization
problem efficiently, which is independent of the multi-objective optimization
formulation for the recovery as shown in Figure 3.3. There are alternative ap-
proaches to keep the objectives separately, e.g., non-sorting genetic algorithm
II, if preferred.
3.5. Numerical Application
3.5.1 Bridge network characteristics
The proposed methodology is illustrated using a hypothetical road transporta-
tion network, shown in Figure 3.5, in which there are 37 arcs and 30 nodes.
The gray nodes (Node 9 and 17) represent emergency nodes and other nodes
represent normal nodes. For simplicity, each arc is assumed to be associated
with exactly one bridge; out of the 37 bridges, 19 are steel (S) bridges and
18 are reinforced concrete (RC) bridges. A scenario earthquake with a magni-
tude 7.0 and an epicenter distance of 40 km from the centroid of the network is
considered for this illustration. The network parameters used in this illustra-
tion, including bridge type and ADT, are tabulated in Table 3.2. The initial
damage levels for all bridges for the stipulated hazard event are tabulated in
Table 3.2. Among the 37 bridges, 15 bridges sustained negligible damages,
while the other 22 suffer damage at different levels: 6 have major (complete or
extensive) damages, 5 are moderately damaged and 11 have slight damages.
These initial damage levels are assigned inversely proportional to the bridge
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reliabilities [90], and are used as a starting point for recovery scheduling. To
simplify the computation, the damage level is converted to binary with mod-
erate damage as the threshold. That is, if damage level is less or equal to 2,
the bridge is functional; otherwise, it is not. The restoration duration of each
damaged bridge is also presented in Table 3.2. The uncertainty models that it
is assumed for the parameters Fij(ξ˜) and Db(ξ˜) are summarized in Table 3.3.
The network WIPW prior to and immediately following the scenario event are
1.74 and 0.62, respectively, representing a 64.4% sudden drop in network per-
formance (the vertical coordinates of the resilience curve). In the subsequent
network recovery optimization, it is assumed that the bridges with a damage
levels 2-4 cannot carry traffic until the completion of their scheduled repair;
furthermore, the limited available resources for recovery, representing a mid-
income (average) community, only allow a maximum number of 4 bridges to
be repaired and restored simultaneously, i.e. N tSI ≤ 4.
3.5.2 Optimal schedule for network restoration
The optimal bridge restoration schedule is determined using the GA summa-
rized in Figure 3.4. The specific tuning parameters and stopping criterion
play a critical role in the efficacy of the algorithm. These parameters include
population size, crossover rate, mutation rate, and elitist mechanisms (see,
e.g., [30]). A generation in the GA refers to one complete cycle as depicted in
Figure 3.4. Table 3.4 summarizes the GA parameters used in this illustration,
which were determined after extensive experimentation.
This experiment generates 500 random instances using MCS and optimize the
restoration of each of the 500 instances using the aforementioned GA. Fig-
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Table 3.1: Mean values of network parameters for recovery
Bridge ID Construction Type ADT (Vehicle/Hour) Month of Restoration
1 RC 2200 4.1
2 RC 1900 1.71
3 S 2000 10.21
4 S 1500 0
5 RC 1900 6.52
6 S 2200 0
7 S 700 0
8 S 2400 0
9 S 2600 3.99
10 S 300 4.75
11 S 800 1.44
12 RC 900 2.38
13 S 2500 0
14 S 600 2.42
15 RC 2000 1.4
16 S 500 2.11
17 RC 2500 3.32
18 RC 2800 0
19 S 1300 2.49
20 S 1700 0
21 S 1500 9.04
22 S 1200 3.34
23 RC 1500 0
24 S 700 1.28
25 S 1800 0
26 S 900 5.02
27 S 600 5.25
28 RC 800 6.65
29 RC 1400 0
30 RC 2800 2.35
31 RC 1900 2.46
32 RC 2900 0
33 RC 1300 1.65
34 RC 900 0
35 RC 2200 0
36 RC 700 0
37 RC 3000 0
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Table 3.2: Mean values of network parameters for recovery
Damage Level Condition # of bridges Bridge ID
0 No damage 15 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 18, 20, 2325, 29, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37
0-1 Slight damage 11 2, 11, 12, 14, 15, 1619, 24, 30, 31, 33
1-2 Moderate damage 5 1, 9, 17, 22, 27
2-3 Extensive damage 3 5, 10, 26
3-4 Collapsed 3 3, 21, 28
Table 3.3: Statistics of network parameters for recovery
Parameters Notation Distribution Mean COV
Average Daily Traffic (ADT) Fij(ξ) Uniform In Table 3.2 0.05
Month of restoration Dd(ξ) Normal In Table 3.2 0.05
Table 3.4: Parameters setting in the GA
Parameters Value
Population 50
Cross-over rate 0.9
Mutation rate 0.3
Elitist selection 20
Maximum generations 1,000
Maximum time 1,800 seconds
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Figure 3.6: Probability density of the total recovery time (TRT)
ure 3.6 illustrates the distribution of optimal network recovery time under
stochastic conditions. Considering the uncertainties associated with restora-
tion duration and ADT for each bridge, the mean network recovery time is
21.3 months and the standard deviation is approximately 20 days. The ∆t
and tk in Eq. (3.4) are set to be 1 day and 50 months, respectively. In the
remainder of this section, the author focuses our discussion on the optimal
solution for a single instance of the simulation, x˜ , where all the random vari-
ables are taken as their mean values. This discussion is applicable for all other
simulated scenarios.
Figure 3.7 shows the fitness values defined by Eq. (3.7) over the CPU time with
three random initial populations in genetic algorithm. GA is allowed to run up
56
to 60 minutes and it is observed that GA converges in 30 minutes. Therefore,
the maximum allowable running time is set as 30 minutes for all experiments
in this section. The best fitness value in the initial GA population is 78.14 and
decreases to 49.95 in 30 minutes (600 generations). The fitness value of 49.95 is
the sum of the network TRT (21.42 months) and SRT (28.53 months). Figure
3.8 illustrates the quality of the near-optimal solution from each generation
of GA with respect to the fitness function, which shows that TRT and SRT
are highly positively correlated. Note that this correlation will be much less
if all feasible solutions are included in the Figure 3.8. Even with only the
near-optimal solutions, Figure 3.8 indicates that for a given TRT there exist
many alternative strategies with different SRT representing different recovery
trajectories. This observation confirms that TRT alone, if used as the sole
objective for recovery, is not sufficient to ensure the optimal recovery schedule
with the best trajectory. The SRT ensures the recovery efficiency among the
alternative schedules that represent the same recovery time.
The optimal network restoration schedule is illustrated in Figure 3.9, which
shows the times at which restoration intervention is initiated and completed
for each damaged bridge. The length of the bar associated with each bridge
is the duration of the intervention. This optimum schedule allows all dam-
aged bridges in the network to be restored in less than 21 months, given that
the maximum of 4 bridges can be repaired simultaneously. To evaluate the
efficiency of this scheduling, the work compares this optimal solution with a
naïve network restoration schedule in which all the damaged bridges tabulated
in Table 3.3 are repaired in a randomly selected sequence as shown in Figure
3.10. In this case, 23.5 months are required to completely restore the network.
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Figure 3.7: Fitness values over time with three random initial populations in
GA
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Figure 3.8: TRT and SRT of the optimal solutions
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Figure 3.11 illustrates that the network recovery trajectory associated with the
optimal recovery plan is superior to that of the random restoration sequence.
Note that these two recovery schedules employ the same amount of resources
and the only difference between them is the sequence in which the damaged
bridges are restored to their pre-event conditions. These trajectories based on
the mean restoration time. Because the variance of all work crews are iden-
tical, the GA solution and naive solution share the same standard deviation.
However, if the COV varies across teams, variance comparison between opti-
mal and random solutions should be added. Although, the 2.5-month seems to
be an insignificant improvement in this illustration, one that could be achieved
by adding some common sense to the completely random strategy, the advan-
tage of this scheduling algorithm would become more obvious when dealing
with large, extensively-damaged networks where the decision variables, possi-
ble alternative strategies and constraints create a complex decision problem
where intuition may not apply. Furthermore, if a short-term network recov-
ery objective is to ensure that there is at least one path, on average, between
each O-D pair (i.e. the performance metric WIPW is equal or greater than
1), then the optimal recovery scheduling achieves this objective 8 months ear-
lier than the random scheduling. It is noted that the bridges selected in the
early phase in the optimal solution, i.e. bridges 14, 24, 28, are the bridges
with the highest impact on the overall network performance, as measured by
WIPW, because they are shared by multiple O-D pairs and are close to the
emergency facilities. These results demonstrate that the optimal scheduling
of bridge restoration can greatly improve the efficiency of the transportation
network recovery. Bridge authorities can use this information to allocate their
limited resources intelligently to both minimize total network recovery time
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Figure 3.9: Optimal scheduling with times for initiation and completion of
restoration for each damaged bridge
and to maximize the recovery efficiency.
To investigate the sensitivity of the scheduling to the resourcefulness of the
community (an important characteristic of community resilience), rather than
assuming a constant amount of recovery resources (i.e. NmaxSI = 4 ), it is
now supposed that the maximum number of simultaneous restoration inter-
ventions, NmaxSI , is a dynamic quantity, which changes the recovery process
to reflect different community social-economic structures and investment pat-
terns. For instance, poorer communities may have fewer resources available
immediately following the event and may depend on outside resources which
take time to deploy. To address this case, it is assumed that the value of NmaxSI
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Figure 3.10: Naïve (random) bridge restoration sequence
62
Figure 3.11: Network recovery trajectories with different restoration schedules
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is 2 for the first seven months, 4 from the seventh to fourteenth months, and
6 after the fourteenth month. Conversely, a wealthy community might have
more resources on hand to address the initial impacts of a disaster, but may
decrease the investment in recovery as the network resilience improves. To
model such a situations, it is assumed that NmaxSI is dynamically decreasing
from NmaxSI = 6 for the first seven months, 4 for the following seven months,
and then 2 until all bridges are repaired. Figure 3.12 illustrates the associ-
ated resilience trajectories for the three communities with different resource
investment patterns: wealthy (6->4->2), middle-income as considered previ-
ously with constant recovery resources (4->4->4) and poor (2->4->6). The
recovery time of the wealthy and middle-income communities are about the
same; however, the skew of the recovery trajectory of the wealthy community
indicates a more efficient recovery schedule. The network performance met-
ric WIPW of the wealthy community achieves the value of 1 at month seven
which is two months earlier than is achieved by the average community. Fur-
thermore, although the poor community has 6 simultaneous interventions in
progress after 14 months, its total recovery time still is 3 months longer than
that of both the wealthy and the average communities. It is evident that the
resource allocation pattern as a function of time can significantly impact the
efficiency of the network recovery.
3.6. Summary
This chapter has presented a novel and dynamic model to optimize the restora-
tion schedules of transportation networks following extreme events. The model
incorporates a network resilience-based performance metric, recovery trajec-
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Figure 3.12: Resilience as a function of time under different recovery capability
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tory, community resourcefulness, and uncertainties relating to damage levels
and restoration duration of damaged bridges in a quantitative resilience-based
decision framework for road network recovery. This work employs a powerful
metaheuristic approach to find near-optimal solutions for recovery scheduling.
The following three aspects of the restoration process are addressed.
First, the author introduced a two-dimensional metric - total recovery time
(TRT) and the skew of recovery trajectory (SRT) - as measures for the network
recovery planning, both of which are significantly affected by the restoration
sequence when resources for post-disaster recovery are limited. This two-
dimensional metric can be used collectively as the objectives in identifying the
optimal post-event scheduling for the network recovery.
Second, according to Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12, simple functions (linear
or nonlinear) for recovery trajectory apparently do not exist in even simple
networks such as the one considered herein. Different prioritization schedules
can lead to significant changes in both TRT and SRT. The dynamic nature
of available resources (immediately on-hand or delayed due to outsourcing)
can have a notable impact on the network recovery time and trajectory. Even
under circumstances in which the total amount of resources utilized in the
recovery period is the same, the recovery trajectory is sensitive to the timing
in which such resources are made available.
Third, both the scheduling framework and the genetic algorithm used to obtain
the optimal solutions can be extended to handle large and complex networks.
This problem is NP-Hard [56]; accordingly, the problem solving time may in-
crease significantly with the size of the network. However, there is no limitation
regarding network size on the mathematical formulation itself presented herein.
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Moreover, many advanced techniques can be employed to reduce the solving
time, such as parallelized computing. Finally, the distribution of recovery
time under stochastic conditions, the intelligent network restoration schedul-
ing (intervention time and completion time) and the corresponding recovery
trajectory can be visualized easily, which provides a wealth of information for
bridge authorities to make decisions regarding the post-disaster recovery of
transportation networks.
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Chapter 4
Stage-wise Decision Framework for
Transportation Network Resilience
Planning
4.1. Introduction
In Chapter 2 and 3, the author has discussed the definition of a new metric
to quantify the transportation network performance, i.e., WIPW, and pro-
posed two more metrics for recovery, i.e., total recovery time and the skew
of recovery trajectory. The corresponding stochastic optimization models are
developed to support resilience-based decision for both pre-disaster mitigation
and post-disaster recovery. In this chapter, this research present a more flex-
ible decision framework by adjusting the weights in WIPW according to the
different stages with the nonoccurence of extreme events to improve resilience
of the transportation network. Resilience - defined as the ability of social units
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(e.g., organizations, communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of
disasters when they occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that min-
imize social disruption and mitigate the effects of future hazards - can be
measured, as shown in Figure 2.1, by four major attributes: robustness (abil-
ity to withstand extreme events), rapidity (speed of recovering from impacts
of extreme events), redundancy (alternative or backup components within the
system), and resourcefulness (availability of emergency resources to respond
to disasters) [14]. A notable growing body of literature has been published
to evaluate the performance of transportation systems from the perspective of
network resilience to natural hazards [18, 63, 82, 28, 37, 45, 17, 39, 90, 92].
Research studies have recently extended to decision formulations regarding
risk mitigation, response and recovery of roadway networks at a community
or regional scale. Bell et al. [8] used travel time reliability as the network per-
formance indicator to study the transportation vulnerability under terrorist
attacks, in which decisions regarding the path used in the road network were
made to minimize the maximum of expected loss from a predefined disruption.
Bell et al. [7] proposed capacity weighted spectral partitioning to identify the
bottleneck of transportation network, which does not require information of
origin-destination matrix and path assignment. Chang and Nojima [18] devel-
oped a decision method for post-disaster evacuation using a proposed trans-
portation simulation model which was capable of capturing the change of traffic
pattern following seismic events. Miller-Hooks et al. [61] proposed a two-stage
stochastic programming model to maximize transportation network resilience,
defined as the expected traffic demand supplied following a disastrous event,
by enhancing pre-disaster preparedness and optimizing post-disaster schedul-
ing. This model was later extended in Faturechi and Miller-Hooks [35] to
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a three-stage, bi-level stochastic mathematical program, in which the upper-
level is a sequence of actions for both pre-disaster mitigation and post-disaster
restoration, and the lower-level reconstructs the routine for affected users us-
ing partial user equilibrium model. Sheu and Pan [76] presented a survivor
perception “attitude” resilience conceptual model with the focus on maximiz-
ing the survivor resilience after disaster. Sheu and Pan [76] integrated three
sub-networks (shelter network, medical network, and distribution network) to
build a seamless centralized emergency supply network in response to natu-
ral disasters. Zhang et al. [92] optimized roadway network recovery from an
earthquake event by incorporating network topology, redundancy, traffic flow,
damage states and available resources into a stochastic decision processes, re-
sulting in an optimal schedule for sequencing restoration interventions for all
damaged bridges, which lead to the fastest (in terms of time) and most efficient
(in terms of indirect loss) network recovery process.
Reviewing these studies has revealed the following: i) most research studies
only investigated the decision formulation or process at one point in time with
respect to the occurrence of a hazard, and ii) different studies selected different
network performance metrics as the basis for their decisions at hand. It has
become apparent that the time at which a decision is made (with respect to
the hazard occurrence) determines the situation (or constraints) and purpose
(or objectives) of the decision process. It is therefore necessary for a decision
framework to reflect these dynamic perspectives across the different stages of
resilience planning through carefully defined performance metrics, interven-
tions, objectives and constraints. There is an increasing need for a consistent
methodology to support stage-wise resilience planning of roadway networks
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as more and more communities are beginning to incorporate resilience as a
concept in their day-to-day risk management practices.
4.2. Stage-wise decision framework
The resilience concept, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, clearly has a time dimen-
sion. On one hand, risk mitigation and disaster management interventions at
different points in time with respect to the occurrence of hazard are very dif-
ferent, necessitating different decision support [58]. On the other hand, these
decisions, although made at different planning stages, should serve the same
overarching goal of enhancing network resilience in a systematic fashion. This
section proposes a stage-wise decision framework, as illustrated in Figure 4.1,
to support resilience planning of the transportation network in three phases:
Stage I - pre-disaster mitigation; Stage II - post-disaster emergency response;
and Stage III - long-term recovery; i.e.:
• Stage I refers to the mitigation planning stage prior to a disaster. An
often-used mitigation strategy for roadway networks is to retrofit net-
work components (i.e. bridge and roads), with an objective of enhancing
network robustness (cf. Figure 2.1) and subsequently reducing damage
and functionality loss of the network when a hazard event occurs. This
pre-event mitigation decision problem concerns how many and which net-
work components should be selected for retrofit subject to the available
finances and other resource limitations. The author proposes, for Stage
I, a prioritization mechanism for retrofit interventions that maximizes
the network robustness under budget constraints.
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• Stage II refers to the chaotic emergency response stage during or shortly
after the occurrence of a hazard event. The primary functionality of a
roadway network in Stage II is to connect affected population to crit-
ical facilities, e.g. hospitals, fire stations, police stations, etc., and to
provide routes enabling repair crews to access damaged components of
utility (e.g. power and water) networks. This functionality requirement
in Stage II is often resumed through rapid repairing or establishing tem-
porary pathways under time pressure. This study therefore presents a
decision method to identify the damaged network components for rapid
repair that can resume, within the shortest time frame, the connectivity
between the O-D pairs that are critical for life rescue.
• Stage III refers to the long-term recovery phase, in which the impaired
network is gradually restored to its pre-disaster functionality level through
repair interventions. The recovery time of the network is the time it
takes to repair or reconstruct all the damaged roads and bridges, which
is governed by the availability of construction resources (i.e. funding,
contractors, construction materials, etc.) and how they are distributed
spatially along the time steps of the recovery phase. For Stage III, the
author proposes a scheduling approach to sequence the repair interven-
tions constrained by the characteristic of resource availability in order to
resume network functionality efficiency with the most desirable recovery
trajectory and the shortest recovery time.
The proposed stage-wise decision framework includes two major components:
1) a stage-wise network metric (SWM) system, that is formulated to be com-
patible with the unique objectives of the specific decisions in each of the plan-
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the stage-wise decision framework
ning stages; and 2) a stage-wise formulation of the decisions (SWD), using
the SWM system as the network performance indicators in different planning
stages as the basis for decision-making. The formulations of SWM and SWD
are discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.
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4.3. Stage-wise network performance metric sys-
tem
Different objectives of distnctive planning phases require specific network per-
formance metrics, and different choices of metrics used in a decision formula-
tion will ultimately result in different decisions. Cutter et al. [29] emphasized
that the most important criteria for metric selection is validity, which speaks
to the question of whether the metric is representative of the resilience dimen-
sion or the decision of interest. General-purpose network performance metrics,
either topology-based or functionality-based, usually cannot appropriately re-
flect the specific objectives of the decisions in each of the resilience planning
stages. In particular, topology-based metrics (e.g. connectivity, density, etc.)
alone do not reflect network functionality requirements which often are the
focuses of resilience-based decisions; on the other hand, functionality-based
metrics (e.g. travel cost, maximum traffic capacity) ordinarily require “too
much” information (e.g. pre- and post-event network supply-demand at differ-
ent spatial and temporal resolution), which may not be readily available and,
more importantly, may not be directly relevant or representative of the spe-
cific objectives of the decisions to be made. That is, a metric that incorporates
“too much” information could lose its sensitivity as a performance indicator
to a specific dimension of network performance that is directly relevant to
the current decision. To best support the stage-wise resilience planning of
roadway networks, the author first develops a stage-wise network performance
metric (SWM) system that includes three metrics all based on the concept of
independent pathways (IPW): reliability-weighted IPW (RIPW), emergency
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facility-weighted IPW (EIPW), and daily traffic-weighted IPW (TIPW), to
support decisions in Stage I, II and III, respectively.
Edge-independent pathways, i.e. IPW, referred to in the SWM system, is
an important concept in network science. The set of all IPWs in a network
is defined as all paths between a two distinct nodes that do not share any
common edges (e.g., road segments)[65]. IPW provides a measure of network
redundancy, which is an essential topological feature of roadway networks that
strongly and positively correlates to network resiliency as observed in the 1989
Loma Prieta earthquake in California [4]. Recognizing that redundancy in
transportation network enhances resiliency, the author employs IPW is as a
common substrate for the SWM system; and depending on the specific ob-
jective of the decisions in each stage, the network functionality-specific and
component-specific attributes are weighted into the formulation of the IPW-
based SWM system, as presented next.
The author describes a transportation network on a directed graph G = (V,A)
when V = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of nodes and A = {1, 2, ..,m} is the set of
edges that represent road segments without or with maximum of one bridge.
The set V is partitioned into two mutually exclusive sets E = {1, 2, ..., e} com-
prised of emergency nodes (representing critical facilitates, e.g., fire stations
and hospitals) and N = {e+1, e+2, ..., n} of non-emergency nodes (represent-
ing major destinations, e.g., residential areas, economic hubs, and major road
intersections). Let Kij and P kij, respectively, denote the total number of IPWs
and the kth IPW between node i ∈ V and j ∈ V . Each IPW is a set of ordered
edges connected in series. An algorithm for computing Kij and searching for
P kij between all node pairs can be found in Zhang and Wang [90]. Let IPWi
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denote the average number of IPWs between node i ∈ V and all the other
n− 1 nodes, i.e.,
IPWi =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
j=1
Kij (4.1)
The IPW of network G is defined as the overall average of all IPWi values for
every node i ∈ V ,
IPW (G) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(4.2)
Note that IPW is independent of traveler behavior and origin-destination (O-
D) demand values and can be computed efficiently using either Dijkstra’s al-
gorithm or the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm for max flows [3].
4.3.1 Reliability weighted IPW, RIPW
In Stage I, the purpose of pre-disaster mitigation through component retrofit
is to enhance the network robustness as discussed in Section 4.2, i.e. to reduce
the network damage when hazard occurs. Increasing reliability (or reducing
failure probability) of selected network components to minimize the possible
damages to the IPWs between all O-D pairs is the objective of retrofit inter-
ventions. Accordingly, the author defines reliability-weighted IPW, RIPW, as
the network performance metric to support the Stage I pre-event mitigation
decisions. Assuming conservatively that reliabilities of edges are statistically
independent, the reliability of path pkij, denoted as Rkij, is the product of the
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reliabilities of all edges included in the path P kij,
Rkij =
∏
l∈Pkij
ql (4.3)
where l and ql are the edge index and the corresponding reliability. The average
number of reliable IPWs for node i ∈ V is denoted as QRi and calculated as
shown in Eq (4.4),
QRi =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
Rkij (4.4)
Let QR(G) denote the RIPW of network G which is computed in Eq (4.5):
QR(G) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
QRi (4.5)
A critical step to compute RIPW is to quantify reliabilities of the edges (i.e.,
road segments and bridges), which depends on the specific hazard of interest,
and often are evaluated through fragility analyses associated with damage
states of interest.
4.3.2 Emergency node-weighted IPW, EIPW
In Stage II, immediately after a disruptive event, emergency managers need
to quickly identify and establish emergency routes to send rescue teams and
relief resources to the affected population. The connectivity between critical
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facilities and the people who need to be rescued is of the paramount concern
[47, 42]. Accordingly, it is defined that the emergency facility-weighted IPW,
EIPW, as the network performance metric for Stage II. EIPW measures the
average number of independent pathways between emergency nodes and non-
emergency nodes. The EIPW is highly dependent on the post-event damage
condition of the network. Let dij denote the damage status of edge (i, j) ∈ A,
which can be measured on a 0 to 4 scale, corresponding to the damage level
of none, slight, moderate, extensive and complete, respectively, as termed
in Scawthorn et al. [75]. Edges with the damage conditions of extensive or
complete are considered unserviceable. The serviceability of edge (i, j) ∈ A is
denoted sij and defined as,
sij =

1, dij ≤ 2
0, otherwise
. (4.6)
Eq. (4.7) defines the serviceability of P kij, denoted as skij, as the product of the
serviceability of all road edges included in the path P kij:
skij =
∏
l∈Pkij
sl (4.7)
If ssij equals 1, the path is serviceable and if it equals 0, it is not. Let QEi
denote the EIPW of node:
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QE(g) =
1
e
∑
j∈E
Kij∑
k=1
skij (4.8)
The EIPW of a network is defined as the average EIPW of non-emergency
nodes, which is computed as,
QE(G) =
1
n− e
∑
i∈N
QEi (4.9)
If QE(G) equals 0, the transportation network cannot support any emergency
actions.
4.3.3 Average daily traffic weighted IPW, TIPW
In Stage III, the author uses the pre-event average daily traffic (ADT) weighted
IPW, or TIPW, as the network performance metric fundamental to decisions.
The ADT on roads and bridges are the field measurements routinely main-
tained by the Federal or State Department of Transportation. ADT data may
be more accurate than current traffic assignment models at representing real
traffic patterns since the path choice of travelers are only partially rational,
whereas traffic assignment models commonly assume decisions to be based on
distance or travel time [89, 69]. It is emphasized that the work uses pre-event
ADT data as the benchmark for recovery decisions, as the goal in Stage III is
to resume the full pre-event functionality level of the network through a timely
and effective recovery process. The service level of each edge (i, j) is idealized
as 1 − dij/4. For example, if an edge is completely damaged, dij is set to be
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4, and the corresponding service level is 0. The service level of the path P kij
is approximated as the product of the service levels of all arcs l ∈ P kij. Let Al
denote the ADT of edge l ∈ P kij. Define Akij, the ADT of P kij, as the minimum
ADT of all edges on that pathway, i.e.,
Akij = min{Al|l ∈ P kij} (4.10)
The normalized ADT of the path is defined as:
A˜kij =
KijA
k
ij∑Kij
p=1A
p
ij
(4.11)
Note that for any node pair (i, j) ∈ V , ∑Kijk=1 Âkij = Kij. Let QAi denote the
TIPW of node i ∈ V and
QTi =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
j=1
Kij∑
k=1
Âkij min
l∈Pkij
(
1− dl
4
)
(4.12)
The TIPW of a network is further defined as:
QT (G) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
QTi (4.13)
For Stage III, a damaged transportation network is considered fully recovered
80
if all the damaged roadway segments are restored, i.e., the network TIPW
computed using Eq. (4.13) returns to its pre-disaster level (without damaged
network components).
The defined SWM - comprised of RIPW, EIPW and TIPW - are tailored and
sensitive to the unique objectives of the specific decisions they are serving, at
the same time, they ensure a level of consistency among the decisions in differ-
ent planning stages. These IPW-based metrics can be employed individually
to support decisions at each planning stage, or used together as a system in
the SWD formulated in Section 4.4.
4.4. Formulation of the stage-wise decision frame-
work
4.4.1 Stage I - pre-disaster risk mitigation
At Stage I, the decision is to make selections from a set of candidate edges
to maximize the RIPW and simultaneously minimize the related investment
cost. The mitigation decisions, represented as the binary decision vector x, is
comprised of a component xij for each (i, j) ∈ A as defined as below,
xij =

1, edge (i, j) is selected
0, otherwise
,∀(i, j) ∈ A (4.14)
The first objective of the decision process is to maximize the expected RIPW:
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max QR(x) = Eξ˜q
 1n
n∑
i=1
1
n− 1
n−1∑
j=1
Kij∑
k=1
[
(1− xl)ql(ξ˜q) + xlq′l
] (4.15)
where ql(ξq) is the realization of the random variables ql representing the reli-
abilities of edge l ∈ P kij prior to retrofit, and q′l is the reliability of edge after
retrofit. Eq. (4.15) ensures that the reliability of edge l is q′l if it is selected;
otherwise, it does not change. Let C(x) denote the total cost associated with
decision x. The second objective is to minimize the expectation of total retrofit
costs:
min C(x) = Eξ˜c
 ∑
(i,j)∈A
cij(ξ̂c)xij
 (4.16)
where cij(ξ̂c) is the stochastic realization of random variable retrofit cost cij.
This decision problem is closely related to the stochastic knapsack problem
[74], but further complicated by the procedure of iteratively computing a se-
ries of weighted shortest paths. The non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm
II (NSGA-II), successfully applied to several similar problems [9, 32], is em-
ployed to identify the near-optimal Pareto frontier for this multi-objective
optimization problem in which the two objectives conflict. The author cou-
ples NSGA-II with Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) and optimize the expected
RIPW and total costs.
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4.4.2 Stage II: post-disaster emergency response
In this stage, the problem is to select a number of edges from failed edges and
to schedule their restoration sequence, the objective is to minimize the total
time to ensure that there exists at least one path between non-emergency
nodes and emergency nodes. Let D = {1, 2, ..., b} denote the set of damaged
edges (candidates). Let xl and yl respectively denote whether or not to select
edge l ∈ D and the time at which emergency restoration is initiated for edge
l ∈ D. The network emergency recovery time associated with the selection x
and schedule y is denoted as tE(x, y). Let s′l and pl(ξ̂p) denote serviceability
for each edge l ∈ D after emergency restoration and the stochastic variables
of duration of temporal action. Let T denote the set of discrete points in
time: t0 ∪ {t1, ..., tb} which is the union of initial time t0 and the intervention
completion times tl = xl
[
yl + pl(ξ̂p)
]
for each edge l ∈ D. Using the above
notation, the emergency accessibility recovery model is presented as follows:
min tE(x, y) = Eξ̂p < maxl∈D {xl[yl + pl(ξ̂p)]} − t0 > (4.17)
subject to:
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∑
j∈E
Kij∑
k=1
∏
l∈Pkij
s′l ≥ 1,∀i ∈ N (4.18)
s′l = (1− xl)sl + xl,∀l ∈ D (4.19)∑
l∈D
[t ≥ yl][t ≤ yl + pl(ξ̂p)] ≤ NmaxSI ,∀t ∈ T (4.20)
yl ≤Mxl,∀l ∈ D (4.21)
s′l ∈ {0, 1},∀l ∈ D (4.22)
xl ∈ {0, 1},∀l ∈ D (4.23)
yl ≥ 0,∀l ∈ D (4.24)
Eq. (4.17) defines the total emergency accessibility recovery time as the inter-
vention completion time of the very last scheduled edge. Eq. (4.18) requires
each non-emergency node to have at least one IPW to an emergency node
and Eq. (4.19) ensures the edge remains at its initial serviceability unless it
is selected for restoration. In Eq. (4.20), [P ] is the Iverson bracket, which
returns 1 if is true, and 0 otherwise. NmaxSI denotes the maximum number of
simultaneous emergency restoration interventions possible based on the the
human and financial resources available in the community for emergency re-
covery during this stage. The parameter M in Eq. (4.21) is set to a large
number and is used to ensure edge l ∈ D is scheduled for restoration only if
it is selected. Note that M must be a sufficiently large number (e.g., greater
than any reasonable scheduling times) to not unintentionally reduce the set of
feasible solutions.
The problem under investigation is closely related to the NP-hard parallel
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machine selection and scheduling problem [22, 81, 16]. It is assumed that
bridge repair scheduling is non-preemptive, that is, once a crew has begun
repair on a given bridge, they must complete their work before moving to
another bridge. A genetic algorithm (GA) is employed to identify the near-
optimal solutions for the emergency accessibility recovery problem.
4.4.3 Stage III: Long-term recovery
In the final stage, the objective is to restore the transportation system to the
pre-disaster condition with minimized total recovery time and maximized effi-
ciency. This chapter utilizes two criteria to evaluate the rapidity and efficiency
of the long-term recovery scheduling: total recovery time (TRT) and the skew-
ness of the recovery trajectory (SRT), which are recently introduced by Zhang
et al. [92]. It must be noted that the emergency restoration in Stage II is only
associated with temporary interventions, that is, any bridge selected in Stage
II, has not been repaired for long-term use and must be considered in Stage
III. The long-term recovery problem then is to determine an optimal schedule
x = {x1, x2, ..., xb} for the repair of all damaged edges. Let rl(ξ̂p) denote the
realization of the random variable denoting the duration of the restoration
intervention on bridge l. Let tR(x) and ts(x) denote the TRT and SRT asso-
ciated with schedule x, respectively. The author sets T ′ = {t′0, t′1, ..., t′b} as the
permutation of T such that t′0 ≤ t′1 ≤ t′2 ≤ ... ≤ t′b The long-term recovery
model is presented as below:
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mintR(x) = Eξ̂p
{
max
l∈B
[
xl + rl(ξ̂p)
]
− t0
}
(4.25)
mintS(x) = Eξ̂p
{∑u
i=1 t
′
iQ
A
t′i
(t′i − t′i−1)∑u
i=1Q
A
t′i
(t′i − t′i=1)
}
(4.26)
subject to:
QAt =
1
n
n−1∑
1
1
n− 1
n−1∑
j=1
Kij∑
k=1
Âkij min
l∈Pkij
(
1− dl
4
)
,∀t ∈ T ′ (4.27)
dtl = dl
[
xl + pl(ξ̂p > t)
]
,∀t ∈ T ′ (4.28)∑
l∈D
[t ≥ xl][t ≤ xl + pl(ξ̂p)] ≤ NmaxSI ,∀t ∈ T ′ (4.29)
xl ≥ 0,∀l ∈ D (4.30)
As discussed in Section 4.4.1, this study uses NSGA-II to search the near-
optimal non-dominated solutions for the multi-objective stochastic integer-
programming problem.
4.5. Stage-wise resilience planning for roadway
network in Shelby County, TN
The proposed SWD framework is illustrated using a skeleton highway network
in the Shelby County, Tennessee, illustrated in Figure 4.2. The system includes
46 edges representing the highways and 34 nodes representing major road
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intersections and economic hubs; there are 10 hospitals in the study area, 8 of
which are located in downtown. There are 24 bridges are considered in this
skeleton network, and the detailed descriptions of those bridges are presented
in Table 4.1. For simplicity, this investigation only consider bridges as the
vulnerable network components in the subsequent illustration.
The chance of a moderate earthquake occurring in the New Madrid Seismic
Zone (NMSZ) in the near future is high. Scientists estimate that the proba-
bility of a magnitude 6 to 7 earthquake occurring in NMSZ within the next 50
years is higher than 90% [43]. However, most civil infrastructure in the NMSZ
were not seismically designed, as opposed to those in frequent earthquake re-
gions (e.g., California, USA or Japan). The author considers a scenario earth-
quake with magnitude Mw equal to 7.7 and the epicenter located at 35.3N
and 90.3W (on the New Madrid Fault Line) as proposed in the MAE Center
study [1]. A selected ground motion attenuation model [6] is used to estimate
the peak ground acceleration at the site of the bridges.
The random variables, including ADT (Aij), pre-disaster retrofit costs (cij)
(assumed to be a function of bridge geometry, material type, year built, and
deck area), reliabilities (qij) , expected damage (dij) and the corresponding
restoration duration (pij), for each of the bridges under the considered earth-
quake scenario, are assume to be normal distributions, with mean values listed
in Table 1 and an assumed coefficient of variation of 7% (the implication of this
assumption, often made in probabilistic risk analysis, is that the parameters
of each bridge in this network can be estimated to within ± 15% with more
than 95% confidence).
Stage I: Mitigation Strategy
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Figure 4.2: (a) Road network in Shelby County, TN. (b) Detailed network
topology in downtown Memphis, TN. [The plotting area in (b) is highlighted
by the dash-line box in (a)]
88
When all the bridges in the network are subjected to standard traffic flow
(the reliabilities of bridges under service loads are assumed to be 0.99), the
RIPW is 1.697, meaning on average there are 1.697 reliable independent path-
ways (IPW) between all O-D pairs in the network under normal operational
condition. When the prescribed scenario earthquake is considered, the mean
network RIPW drops to 0.635, indicating many O-D pairs become discon-
nected following the earthquake event. Figure 4.3 shows the Pareto front of the
optimal retrofit strategies mapped in the objective space with each triangular
marker representing a non-dominated solution with respect to a specific combi-
nation of financial investment and corresponding RIPW; these non-dominated
solutions cannot be improved with respect to one objective function without
diminishing the other.
The specifics of the four strategies on the Pareto front, highlighted in Figure
3, are summarized in Table 4.22. For example, Strategy I in Figure 4 is
located toward the bottom left of the objective space and emphasizes cost
savings over RIPW. This strategy identified three bridges (bridges 196, 390,
and 515) for retrofit which are located near the center of the roadway system
and likely are included in IPWs for several O-D pairs. Furthermore, bridges
390 and 515 (cf. Table 4.1) are among the bridges with lowest reliability but
their retrofit costs are relatively moderate. Strategy II moves toward spending
more money to improve RIPW and indicates that with a budget of $447K,
9 bridges can be retrofitted, leading to a RIPW of 1.00. The significance
of a RIPW equal to or greater than 1 is that on average at least one reliable
pathway exists between all O-D pairs. The RIPW increases for solutions along
the Pareto front as moving towards the upper right of the objective space. As
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Table 4.1: Mean values of bridge parameters
Bridge ID Reliability ADT Retrofit Cost Damage Status Restoration
196 0.774 21,500 30,796 slight 2
201 0.786 79,910 49,031 slight 4
231 0.781 113,830 48,708 slight 4
251 0.74 94,920 28,799 slight 4
264 0.793 94,130 49,708 none 0
267 0.781 99,190 6,067 none 0
282 0.962 121,570 58,561 none 0
294 0.887 13,260 141,115 extensive 82
308 0.712 28,220 143,994 moderate 24
345 0.408 84,090 121,956 extensive 108
350 0.638 13,770 89,911 slight 8
383 0.716 13,490 54,971 moderate 21
390 0.347 2,040 78,180 complete 287
419 0.745 99,000 79,675 complete 214
456 0.841 39,110 125,180 moderate 22
467 0.9 6,450 44,236 slight 6
475 0.779 14,580 24,289 extensive 67
507 0.519 11,320 97,841 extensive 95
515 0.28 16,890 50,744 complete 267
544 0.835 7,770 23,443 none 0
551 0.336 14,020 123,765 extensive 83
574 0.905 31,660 19,439 moderate 14
617 0.855 16,320 25,996 slight 2
666 0.482 49,190 306,042 none 0
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Figure 4.3: Pareto front: RIPW and Cost
costs increase, more bridges can be selected for retrofit. However, the tradeoff
between RIPW and retrofit cost is not simply one of adding more bridges. For
instance, bridge 196 is selected in Strategy I, but de-selected in Strategy II and
III because neighboring bridges (bridges 345 and 350) are more cost-effective
for improving the overall network RIPW; this Bridge 196 is re-selected again
in Strategy IV when the retrofit budget become sufficiently high. Additionally,
some bridges are always selected in the optimal retrofit solutions, e.g., bridges
390 and 515, often because their reliability is much lower than average, or they
are shared by IPWs between multiple O-D pairs.
Stage II: Emergency Response
The actual damage condition of the network immediately following a hazard
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Table 4.2: Details of four optimal solutions in Pareto front
Strategy E(cost) E(RIPW) # of bridges Bridge selected
I 160K 0.82 3 196, 390, 515
II 447K 1.00 9 267, 350, 383,390,475, 507, 515, 574, 617
III
831K 1.23 12 267, 282, 308, 345,
383, 390, 467, 475,
507, 515, 551, 617
IV
1,329K 1.46 20 196, 201, 231, 251,
264, 267, 282, 308,
345, 350, 383, 390,
419, 456, 467, 475,
507, 515, 544, 551
event should serve as the initial state for the Stage II planning. For illustra-
tion, the mean damage states tabulated in Table 1 as the starting point are
used. As shown in Figure 4.4, following the scenario earthquake, among the 24
bridges, 5 bridges sustained negligible damage, 7 bridges are slightly damaged,
4 bridges have moderate damage, 5 bridges suffered extensive damage, and 3
bridges fail completely. Prior to the scenario earthquake the EIPW is 1.89,
however, immediately after it falls to 0.55. In particular, nodes 11, 13, and 19
(highlighted in Figure 4.4), do not have access to any hospital in the Shelby
area. it is assumed that the time to establish a temporary path is on aver-
age 20 hours and 35 hours for extensively and completely damaged bridges,
respectively, with COV of 10%. Furthermore, it is assumed a maximum of
two repair teams (i.e. NmaxSI = 2) are available for emergency rescue immedi-
ately following the disaster. Our decision space is to schedule the rapid repair
for the 8 severely damaged bridges in order to restore the EIPW between all
non-emergency nodes and hospitals from 0.55 to a value that is greater than
or equal to 1.0 as quickly as possible.
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Figure 4.4: Damage condition of the roadway network
Figure 4.5 reveals the best emergency recovery time defined by Eq. (4.17) at
each iteration of the genetic algorithm. The GA converges at the 16th iteration
with an emergency recovery time of 20 hours. The optimal solution identifies
that the bridge 345 is the most critical bridge to bring the EIPW of nodes 11,
13, and 19 up to 1.0 within the shortest time. These three nodes can all use
bridge 345 (after emergency restoration) and 264 (with only negligible damage)
to access hospitals. While bridge 390 is an alternative candidate (to bridge
345), it is completely damaged and will take longer for emergency restoration.
The illustrated approach provides useful information for emergency managers
to make informed decisions for timely response and relief efforts.
Stage III: Long-term Recovery Scheduling
The network performance in Stage III is evaluated using TIPW as the perfor-
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Figure 4.5: Emergency recovery time over GA iterations
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mance metric defined by Eq. (4.13). The TIPW equals 0.578 following the
earthquake event, while the pre-hazard TIPW is 1.752 under normal traffic
conditions. The decision problem is to determine the restoration schedule for
all the 19 damaged bridges (including slight, moderate, extensive, and com-
plete damage states) to minimize the TRT and SRT. It is assumed limited
resources are available and only a maximum of 5 bridges can be repaired si-
multaneously.
The optimal recovery trajectories are depicted in Figure 4.6. The optimal so-
lution is clearly superior to the suboptimal solution shown, even though they
both have the same total recovery time. For example, the optimal solution
takes 88 days to improve the TIPW to 1.0, while it takes 178 days for the
suboptimal solution to achieve the same results. This confirms that TRT, if
used as the sole objective, is not sufficient to ensure the recovery schedule with
the “best” trajectory. The restoration schedule corresponding to the optimal
solution is detailed in Figure 4.78. The complete network recovery occurs in
300 days given that the maximum of 5 bridges can be repaired simultane-
ously. The optimal strategy selects in the early phase 8 slight or moderately
damaged bridges associated with large traffic flow (e.g., the ADT of bridge
231 is 113K). The restoration of these 8 bridges improves the network TIPW
by 34% in 34 days as displayed in Figure 4.6. Bridge 390 (which takes 287
days to restore) and the other two completely damaged bridges (515 and 419)
are scheduled early along the time horizon to ensure total recovery time is
minimized. These results demonstrate that the optimal scheduling of bridge
restoration can greatly improve the efficiency of the transportation network
recovery. Although reasonable strategies can be developed by empirical anal-
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Figure 4.6: Recovery trajectories with different restoration schedules
ysis, the advantage of the proposed model would become more apparent when
dealing with large, extensively-damaged networks where the decision variables,
possible alternative strategies and constraints create a complex decision prob-
lem where intuition may fail.
4.6. Summary
As more and more communities are incorporating resilience as key concept in
their day-to-day practices, public decision makers and other stakeholders are
likely to be required to take a system perspective concerning physical infras-
tructure risk management. To that end, this chapter formulates a comprehen-
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sive stage-wise decision framework to support the resilience planning activities
for roadway network in the three main stages: pre-disaster mitigation (Stage
I), post-disaster emergency response (Stage II), and long-term recovery (Stage
III). The decision framework includes an IPW-based SWM system and a set of
stochastic SWD formulations that are designed to meet the specific objectives
and decision purposes of each of the planning phases. Specifically:
Three quantitative resilience-based, decision-specific network performance met-
rics: RIPW, EIPW and TIPW are proposed. RIPW is formulated to measure
the network robustness to extreme natural hazards. EIPW is designed to
quantify the critical facility accessibility in damaged roadway networks. TIPW
represents the efficacy of the network in carrying traffic flow. These specifically
defined SWMs are used in formulating the specific objectives of the decisions
in each of the planning phases.
Three stochastic optimization models are formulated to support decisions in
each planning stage. In Stage I, the author develops a multi-objective stochas-
tic binary integer programming problem to select bridges for retrofit with
minimized total cost and maximized RIPW. In Stage II, the author employs
a stochastic integer programming problem to select and schedule emergency
restoration (temporary path) for damaged bridges constrained by limited re-
sources to ensure all residents have access to hospitals within the shortest time
period following extreme events. In Stage III, a multi-objective stochastic inte-
ger programming problem is built to optimize the schedule of network recovery
interventions by minimizing the total recovery time (TRT) and maximizing
the efficiency (SRT) during the recovery period under resource constraints.
All these decision problems are NP-hard; the NSGA-II and GA are designed
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to identify near optimal solutions efficiently and are scalable to handle large
and complex networks.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The goal of this dissertation was to develop a systematic methodology to model
risk from catastrophic events, explore the performance and disaster resiliency
for transportation infrastructure systems, and provide decision support tools
for stakeholders. The principal goals listed in Chapter 1.2 are accomplished by
developing a comprehensive resilience-based metrics system for evaluating the
performance of transportation systems, providing effective intervention strate-
gies and recovery schedules to mitigate potential losses from earthquakes, and
presented stage-wise metrics and decision frameworks. The major conclusions
and contributions from the dissertation are summarized below.
First, network resilience can be improved by increasing reliabilities of criti-
cal bridges/roads through appropriate retrofitting, optimizing network redun-
dancy through new construction, by altering traffic flows through appropriate
routing policies, and by strategically allocating emergency response facilities.
Stakeholders of communities of different sizes, populations and social-economic
vulnerabilities and support systems are likely to reveal different values and
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preferences in evaluating resilience of their transportation systems since the
corresponding network topology, redundancy level, traffic patterns, location
of community emergency response facilities as well as failure probability of
individual bridges is unique for each community. This study has formulated
a quantitative metric, named as weighted number of independent pathways
(WIPW), which can not only permit multiple dimensions of resilience for any
transportation networks but also allow retrofit alternatives to be evaluated
and compared on a common basis. Using the WIPW, a decision methodology
for effective risk mitigation through bridge retrofitting or new construction is
formulated as a multi-objective optimization problem, which shows the Pareto
frontier between competing WIPW and cost objectives. The solutions allow
decision-maker to select the best strategy with the corresponding subjective
preferences in decision process.
Second, this study has presented a novel and dynamic model to optimize the
restoration schedules of transportation networks over the horizon following ex-
treme events using the WIPW as metric of evaluating resilience. The model
incorporates a network resilience-based performance metric, recovery trajec-
tory, community resourcefulness, and uncertainties relating to damage levels
and restoration duration of damaged bridges in a quantitative resilience-based
decision framework for road network recovery. In order to quantify the recov-
ery trajectories, two-dimensional metric - total recovery time (TRT) and the
skew of recovery trajectory (SRT) - are developed to measure the restoration
schedule. Both the values of TRT and SRT are correlated with the restoration
schedule and the available repair crews. The model is solved approximately
using the powerful metaheuristic approach of NSGA-II. The case study in
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Chapter 3 reveals that: (1) Different prioritization schedules can lead to sig-
nificant changes in both TRT and SRT. The value of TRT and SRT are positive
related and SRT can be useful to ensure concaveness of the recovery trajec-
tory. This two-dimensional metric can be used collectively as the objectives
in identifying the optimal post-event scheduling for the network recovery. (2)
According to Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12, simple functions (linear or nonlin-
ear) for recovery trajectory apparently do not exist in even simple networks
such as the one considered herein. The dynamic nature of available resources
(immediately on-hand or delayed due to outsourcing) can have a notable im-
pact on the network recovery time and trajectory. Even under circumstances
in which the total amount of resources utilized in the recovery period is the
same, the recovery trajectory is sensitive to the timing in which such resources
are made available. (3) The distribution of recovery time under stochastic con-
ditions, the intelligent network restoration scheduling (intervention time and
completion time) and the corresponding recovery trajectory can be visualized
easily, which provides a wealth of information for bridge authorities to make
decisions regarding the post-disaster recovery of transportation networks.
Finally, this study introduces a comprehensive stage-wise decision framework
to support the resilience planning activities for roadway network in the three
main stages: pre-disaster mitigation (Stage I), post-disaster emergency re-
sponse (Stage II), and long-term recovery (Stage III). The decision framework
includes an IPW-based SWM system and a set of stochastic SWD formula-
tions that are designed to meet the specific objectives and decision purposes
of each of the planning phases. In specific: (a) the WIPW is decomposed
to a stage-wise metric systems with three metrics, i.e., RIPW (for evaluat-
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ing network robustness to extreme natural hazards before hazards), EIPW
(for quantifying critical facility accessibility in damaged roadway networks),
and TIPW (for measuring efficacy of the network in carrying traffic flow); (b)
the corresponding optimization models are formulated to support decisions in
each planning stage. In Stage I, a multi-objective stochastic binary integer
programming problem to select bridges for retrofit with minimized total cost
and maximized RIPW is developed. In Stage II, this study employs a stochas-
tic integer programming problem to select and schedule emergency restoration
(temporary path) for damaged bridges constrained by limited resources to
ensure all residents have access to hospitals within the shortest time period
following extreme events. In Stage III, a multi-objective stochastic integer
programming problem is built to optimize the schedule of network recovery
interventions by minimizing the total recovery time (TRT) and maximizing
the efficiency (SRT) during the recovery period under resource constraints.
All these decision problems are NP-hard; the NSGA-II and GA are designed
to identify near optimal solutions efficiently and are scalable to handle large
and complex networks.
The resilience assessment and modeling of transportation infrastructure sys-
tems cover a broad spectrum of research areas and only some of the components
were studied in detail in this research. The limitations of this research require
additional research in the future, especially in the topics given below. First,
this research assumed that bridges are the only vulnerable components in the
transportation systems, but the vulnerability of other components should be
involved in the future research. Second, this study focused on scenario of seis-
mic damage. However, different types of hazards may cause different patterns
103
of damage and requires modifying the model to accommodate it. For example,
the elevation of roadways should be incorporated in emergency response. Fi-
nally, the interdependency between transportation networks and other utility
infrastructures are not considered in this study. Although transportation is
normally built and operated as a stand-alone system, in reality they depend
on the power and telecommunication networks. For instance, traffic lights and
metro systems require the input of power and signal to be functional. Future
research could be beneficial to understand the interdependency between trans-
portation and other infrastructures to better evaluate and improve the entire
community resilience.
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